MILITARY BATTLES - BATTLE OF HILLI (LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH)

General Description of Military Battles- Battle of Hilli

1.         The battle of Hilli was one of the fiercely fought military battles during the liberation war of Bangladesh.  The battle was fought in two stages, the first one took place on 22 and 23 November 1971 and the second battle took place on 9-11 December 1971.  After the fall of Hilli the Indians had almost a free run up to Bogra.

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Importance of North Western Sector

2.         This Sector was very important strategically because of its location. Siligury corridor, Farakka barrage and Chumbi Valley, a Chinese military base was very close to this Sector.

3.         The waistline linking Hilli with Gaibandha and Phulchari ferry on the Jamuna made this Sector very important. The main thrust of 33 Corps was directed towards Hilli with a view to cut the waistline of North Bengal and seals the area upto Gaibandha. That would cut the Rangpur- Bogra road and isolate the Pakistani 23 Infantry Brigade from rest of the division.

Tactical Importance of Hilli

4.         It is a communication center of great tactical importance.

5.         It is the main gateway to the waistline of north- western sector of Bangladesh and the shortest approach to Ghoraghat and Gaibandha.

6.         It is a nodal point from where roads lead to Bogra, Ghoraghat, Charkai and number of places.

7.         A broad gauge railway line placed through Hilli linking northwest and southwest of Bangladesh.

Pakistani Defense Plan

8.         Pakistan defense was based on strong point. Deployment of Pakistani forces was as follows:

a.         1x company from FFR along with Mujahid Company was deployed in area Basudebpur BOP and Morapara.

b.         1x FFR company was deployed in area Chandipur and Hilli railway station.

c.         1x FFR company at Hilli BOP.

d.         1x FFR company with chaffee tank at Dangapara providing depth.

e.         Noapara was occupied by Rajakars.

Indian Plan

9.         The task of 202 Mountain Brigade was to clear Hilli complex in order to open Axis Hilli-Ghoraghat-Palashbari for 20 Mountain Division.

10.       Their task was later re-defined in terms of capturing only Noapara, Morapara and Basudebpur by using only one battalion. Accordingly 8 guard was tasked and 5 Garwal rifle was kept as brigade reserve.

The Battle

11.       1st Battle.

a.         On 22 November, 2000 hrs, C company of 8 Guards launched attack at Noapara and capr within 2 hours.

b.         A and B Companies launched attack on Morapara. A Company could secure a foothold in the South East part of the village. But B Company faced heavy HMG fire, got severe casualty and only 50 could reach the target.

c.         At this stage, D Company was launched on the same objective and they secured northern and western end of the village Morapara. Situation remained very much confused.

d.         On 23 November, 0500 hours, A Company of 5 Garwal launched attack and capture Basudebpur.

e.         As the day broke out tanks went forward to support but got bogged down in the marshy area. Pakistani forces launched counter attack and all effort to capture Hilli complex failed.

12.       2nd Battle.

a.         On 09 December, one company 22 Marathas infiltrated and occupied Durra. Another coy captured Barachangram.

b.         On 10 December, 4 Rajput attacked Bisapara and captured it with armour. On the same day Indians destroyed some artillery guns by raids at Mahespur.

c.         On 11 December, 4 Rajput again attacked on Baigram and captured it.

d.         By midday of 11 December, 8 Guards attacked Dangapara and Hakimpur and captured it.

Causes of Pakistani Defeat

13.       Causes of defeat were as follows:

a.         Lack of Aggressiveness. The Pakistan defense lacked aggressiveness from the beginning. There was only few counter attack with little or no result and there was almost no aggressive petrol.

b.         Rigidity in Tactics. The Pakistan force did not react to the changed tactical situation. They were still in same concept of holding strong points after first battle once 66 Mountain Brigade captured upto Pirgonj and Noapara, Moraoara, Basudevpur were lost. They could have carried out timely withdraw to the rear and limited offensive could have saved the day.

Lessons learnt

14.       Following lessons can be learnt from defenders point of view:

a.         Provision of Fresh Troops. Fresh troops should be detailed for successive line of defense. But Pakistan forces planned the same troops of forward lines to occupy the successive layers which could not be carried out due to over fatigue and impetus on the part of attackers.

b.         Provision of Strong Mobile Reserve. In any strong point defense concept, strong mobile reserve should be planned and boldly executed which Pakistan forces failed to do.

c.         Aggressiveness in Defense. The defenders were over confident and thought their strong point to be invincible. Instead of carrying out aggressive patrol outside the strong point which would provide early warning and dominations they were glued inside the strong point. Moreover after one position is being overrun Pakistan hardly launched counter attack to recapture the same position.

d.         Righteousness of Cause. Righteousness of cause for war is directly related to the moral of troops which Pakistani force lacked vigorously.

e.         Morale. It is a very essential ingredient for success in any battle. One of the main reasons for Pakistani defeat was their low morale; the troops did not have the faith for the cause to fight.

f.          Popular Support. People had been with liberation forces as they were fighting for the independence of the country. On the contrary Pakistan forces were totally denied of any information, movement of liberation forces being intruder.

g.         Flow of Intelligence. Each and every move and their (Pakistan Force) positions were readily available to allied Army by the local public. The Mukti Bahini guerrillas intimated the latest Information about the enemy activities which facilitated to formulate plans for subsequent operations.

h.         Growing Fear of Insecurity. The Pakistani officers and men were fighting 1200 miles away from their homes and in a hostile land surrounded by a population on which they had perpetuated unheard atrocities and committed the most heinous crimes. Therefore, they were always under constant fear of reprisals from the local population.

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