BATTLE OF THE CHINESE FARM


General Description of The Battle

The Battle of the Chinese Farm took place during October 15 to October 17, 1973 between the Egyptian Army and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as part of the Yom Kippur War. It was fought in the Sinai Peninsula, north of the Great Bitter Lake (GBL) and just east of the Suez Canal, near an Egyptian agricultural research station. The battle began when the IDF launched Operation Abiray-Lev ("Stouthearted Men"), attempting to establish a corridor to the canal and allow bridges to be laid for a crossing. Accordingly, the Israelis attacked Egyptian forces in and around the Chinese Farm.

Battle

As of the night of October 15/16, 16th Infantry Brigade unit bore the main brunt of Israeli attacks throughout the duration of the battle.
Matt had been informed that the crossing area and its environs were clear of Egyptian forces but, out of caution, ordered his tank company to deploy at the Lexicon-Tirtur junction to confront any Egyptian movements towards the crossing site, just 800 meters (2,600 feet) south of the crossroads. The entire company was destroyed after it was ambushed by Egyptian infantry of the 16th Brigade. The company commander was killed and most of his men were casualties, unbeknown to Matt. Meanwhile, Israeli artillery batteries opened fire on the landing site on the west bank, landing around 70 tons of shells and ordnance. In fact, the opposite bank was completely clear of Egyptian troops. The crossing finally got underway at 1:35 AM, over five hours behind schedule. By 9:00 AM there were 2,000 paratroopers across, along with a battalion of thirty tanks. The Israelis sent raiding parties attacking Egyptian SAMs on the west bank, while securing a 4-kilometer-deep bridgehead without facing resistance.
Tuvia Raviv's armored brigade began its diversionary attack against the 16th Division's bridgehead at 5:00 PM on October 15, striking at the bridgehead's center from the east, after a fire preparation. It was repulsed by the Egyptians, as had been expected, but succeeded in its purpose. When the 16th Division's southern flank came under increasing Israeli attack it was assumed that the Israeli objective was to roll up the Egyptian Second Army's right flank, not to open a corridor to the west bank for Israeli forces to cross the canal. For the next 24 hours this remained the general impression among Egyptian commanders, actions henceforth were driven according to that impression. Had they discovered Israeli intentions earlier the Egyptians would almost certainly have been able to defeat the Israeli operation, in light of the greater strength of their forces and reserves near the Deversoir area, on the east and west banks of the Suez Canal.
Lexicon-Tirtur Junction
While the paratroopers prepared to cross Reshef was informed that Akavish had been closed again by Egyptian infantry units soon after his passing. He sent one armored battalion to clear the road and committed his remaining three armored and three mechanized battalions to push northwards and secure Tirtur and the Chinese Farm.
An infantry battalion, forming the right flank of Abd el-Hamid's 16th Brigade, was in position to defend the Lexicon-Tirtur crossroads. Initially Reshef sent two armored battalions northward on Lexicon. As the Israeli tanks neared the infantry battalion they opened heavy fire with anti-tank weapons. They destroyed 27 tanks during this engagement, although seven Israeli tanks managed to break through the battalion's westernmost position on Lexicon and advance northwards to al-Galaa'. Thereafter 'Abd el-Hamid ordered tank-hunting squads – groups of ten equipped with RPG-7 rockets and RPG-43 grenades – to deploy around al-Galaa' and destroy those tanks that penetrated, he also sent a tank company to reinforce the infantry battalion.
At night Reshef moved with his remaining forces north along the canal bank. Bypassing the 16th Brigade's positions, the Israelis soon found themselves in the center of a huge administrative area and vehicle park. Reshef's brigade had stumbled into the command and supply bases of the Egyptian 16th and 21st Divisions. The base was located near the canal on the assumption that it was the safest location from Israeli attacks, which was expected to come from the east where the defenses were strongest, not from the south where defenses and security measures were weakest. Both sides immediately opened fire on each other, inadvertently leading to the destruction of supply trucks and SAM launchers. The Egyptians managed to organize a counterattack by units of the 21st Division; a battalion of the 14th Brigade and a battalion (less one company) of the 18th Brigade. The tanks repelled the Israelis, who sustained significant losses from vastly overwhelming opposing forces.
Brigadier General Hafez, commanding the 16th Infantry Division, planned to contain the Israeli attack from the south by having the 18th Mechanized Brigade occupy defenses north of the Chinese Farm, directly behind the 16th Infantry Brigade, but without its organic tank battalion which was designated as part of the division's reserve. The 1st Armored Brigade was moved from its positions southward to occupy positions between Lateral Road and the canal, on the right flank of the 18th Brigade. Upon the brigade's arrival it engaged Israeli armor from Reshef's brigade in al-Galaa', Egyptian armor destroyed around 15 tanks and several half-tracks. At around 1:00 PM sorties of Egyptian Su-7s destroyed many Israeli tanks in ground-attack missions over al-Galaa' village. The 1st Brigade countered a flanking attempt on its left at 2:00 PM by a tank battalion, thwarting the attack and destroying ten tanks. During its engagements on October 16 the 21st Division managed to destroy over 50 Israeli tanks and APCs, while subject to frequent Israeli air strikes and artillery barrages. The 1st Brigade accounted for most of the kills, while suffering fewer losses.
Meanwhile one of Reshef's mechanized battalions, commanded by Major Nathan Shunari, was reinforced with company-sized remnants of the 40th Tank Battalion now commanded by Captain Gideon Giladi after the previous battalion commander had been wounded. Shunari was ordered to seize the Lexicon-Tirtur junction. He sent the tank company ahead first, which initially reported no Egyptian units, and Shunari dispatched an infantry unit in six half-tracks to the junction. Upon reaching it they discovered that the tank company had already been destroyed and Giladi killed. Soon the vehicles began receiving heavy fire stopping their advance. The unit commander reported casualties and Shunari ordered the remainder of his battalion to aid the pinned-down Israelis. Attempts to rescue the infantry failed and the Egyptian battalion, defending the junction, directed heavy firepower against the area aided by the brigade's artillery. The Egyptian defenders had managed to catch the Israelis in a prepared killing zone. Shunari, whose troops lacked cover and were threatened with destruction, regrouped some of his forces and managed to escape the area in vehicles but the infantry-half-track unit, first sent to the crossroads, remained pinned down.
Reshef sent another tank company to rescue the infantrymen. The tanks advanced towards the Chinese Farm from the south. As they neared the farm, and the village, a downpour of anti-tank and artillery fire forced the company to retreat. Nathan kept pleading with Rehsef to send additional support, unaware he was facing superior Egyptian forces after entering the administrative bases of the Egyptian 16th and 21st Divisions. With no help coming the unit commander had his men carry the wounded and attempted to leave the battlefield, tasking two sections of heavy machine guns with providing cover to the force. As the Israelis slowly made their way back to their lines a group of Egyptian tanks intercepted, wiping out the Israeli force.
Despite the debacle Reshef remained determined to seize the junction, giving the task to the division's reconnaissance battalion attached to his brigade. To achieve surprise the battalion maneuvered to attack at 3:00 AM from the west, as the Egyptians were preparing for further attacks from the south and east. As the Israelis attacked Lt. Col. Brom was killed, barely thirty meters from Egyptian positions, disrupting his battalion's assault. The Israelis sustained losses but managed to retreat. Soon after a tank company attacked the crossroads at 4:00 AM on October 16 but also withdrew after losing three tanks.
By 4:00 AM on October 16 Reshef's brigade, which began the operation with 97 tanks, had lost 56 tanks in just twelve hours of fighting with only 41 tanks remaining. Although seizing the crossing site had been accomplished easily stiff resistance had prevented Reshef from completing his remaining objectives, namely opening the routes to the canal and securing a corridor. Reshef's force would further drop to just 27 tanks by noon. As a whole, Sharon's division had lost some 300 killed and 1,000 wounded that night. To help Reshef secure the corridor Sharon supplied him with two tank battalions by 6:00 PM, propping his numbers up to 81 tanks.
Hearing reports of the heavy fighting taking place between the junction and the Chinese Farm, Dayan suggested withdrawing Matt's brigade and canceling the operation. He voiced concerns that the paratroopers were threatened with annihilation and noted that all attempts to open a corridor for the bridges to be laid had failed. Gonen rejected the suggestion stating that, "If we knew in advance this was going to happen we would not have started the crossing operation, but now that we have crossed then let us follow through to the bitter end." Bar-Lev concurred with Gonen and Dayan decided not to press his suggestion. At around 6:00 AM Golda Meir telephoned Dayan to inquire of the situation. Dayan informed her that the bridges had not yet been laid and that the Egyptians had closed the routes leading to Deveroir. He also stated there were high hopes that Egyptian resistance would be overcome and that the bridges would be laid during the morning. Dayan also told her that Matt's paratrooper brigade had crossed to the west bank without encountering resistance and that Southern Command, as yet, had no intentions of withdrawing the brigade even if the bridge-laying was delayed.
In the morning, shortly after dawn, Reshef conducted a reconnaissance of the battlefield from a hilltop. He saw that the Egyptians had set up a strong blocking position defending the junction, composed of Egyptian tanks situated in hull-down positions and infantrymen in foxholes and the now-dry irrigation ditches of the Chinese Farm. The infantry were from the 16th Brigade's right-flank battalion and had the support of recoilless rifles, RPG-7s and some manually guided AT-3 Sagger missiles. Reshef discovered that the Egyptians had mined both sides of Lexicon Road, to which he had lost several of his tanks.
Reshef decided to change fighting tactics. He personally commanded the 40th Armored Battalions, after reinforcing it with tanks salvaged and repaired from the previous night's fighting, and maneuvered to attack from the west – i.e.: from the direction of the canal – hitting Egyptian positions in the flank while a tank company and an infantry company attacked from south to north. Reshef's forces engaged the Egyptians from long range, picking off defensive positions from afar, while using alternate fire and movement to advance to the crossroads. The infantry battalion, exhausted by continuous fighting and suffering from a severe lack of ammunition, soon withdrew allowing the Israelis to at last seize the junction.
In the meantime other difficulties were surfacing. Sharon reported to Southern Command that the roller bridge, being towed by Erez's brigade, had been damaged in one of its sections and that the engineers needed a few hours to repair it. He also requested additional forces to help secure the corridor, noting the stiff resistance facing Reshef's brigade. Sharon's report prompted Bar-Lev to alert Adan to prepare to open the corridor with his division. Sharon argued for Adan's division to cross the canal on rafts and to proceed with Operation Abiray-Lev without waiting for the bridges. Both Gonen and Bar-Lev rejected Sharon's suggestion since, without a secure corridor to the canal, Israeli forces on the west bank would be threatened with encirclement. Subsequently Bar-Lev ordered that no more Israeli forces or equipment would cross to the west bank until the bridges had been laid.
After receiving reinforcements Reshef focused on clearing the Tirtur Road. He left a battalion of around thirty tanks between the junction and the western part of the Chinese Farm, and prepared to attack with two armored battalions provided by Sharon. He concentrated on the section of the Tirtur Road defended by an Egyptian battalion forming the left flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade. One of Reshef's battalions attacked from the north-east, the other from the west. The Egyptian battalion managed to halt the advance aided by fire from tanks and anti-tank weapons on the slopes of Missouri, a hill north-west of the Chinese Farm, causing Reshef to break off his attack.
This last attempt left Reshef's brigade in a desperate situation. He had 27 tanks remaining and was running short on ammunition and supplies. Reshef requested authorization from Sharon to withdraw his brigade to Fort Lakekan, to regroup his forces and allow them to regain combat effectiveness.
Israeli Reinforcement
The unexpected Egyptian resistance forced Israeli Southern Command to change its plans. Visiting Adan's advance command post Gonen noted that "Sharon has disappointed us" and handed Adan the task of moving the pontoon bridge to the canal. Adan was to prepare to clear the Akavish and Tirtur Roads to deploy the bridges. Gonen informed Sharon of Adan's new orders and tasked Sharon with capturing the Chinese Farm and Egyptian positions near the farm and the canal. In need of regrouping his forces Sharon suggested that he capture the farm, once Adan had cleared the routes to the canal, and Gonen consented. In a later meeting with Dayan and Bar-Lev, Gonen reiterated the latter's statement that no more forces would cross until the bridges were laid, and added that should the situation worsen the paratroopers may be withdrawn.
The 162nd Division, concentrated south of Tasa, had been standing-by to cross the canal since dawn on October 16. The division advanced towards the canal but movement was hampered by the massive traffic jams on the roads leading to the canal. When Adan realized that Akavish was closed, he ordered a tank battalion to make a turning maneuver through the desert to reach Deversoir. When it arrived Sharon contacted Adan, explaining Reshef's difficult situation, and requested that the battalion be placed under his command. Adan accepted and Sharon in turn authorized Reshef's request to pull back and regroup, replacing his brigade with the tank battalion.
After receiving his new orders Adan moved his division to occupy a series of positions opposite 'Abd el-Hamid's 16th Brigade. One of Adan's armored brigades had been placed as a reserve force under Southern Command. 'Abd el-Hamid's left-flank infantry battalion, blocking Tirtur, repelled Israeli tanks attacking westwards and thwarted Adan's efforts to clear the road. Adan realized that, without infantry support, breaking through the Egyptian positions would prove costly. However at 2:00 PM Southern Command notified Adan that he was soon to be supplied with the 35th Paratrooper Brigade, which had been transported by helicopters from Ras Sudar on the Gulf of Suez to Refidem 80 kilometers (50 mi) east of the canal. The brigade made its way to the canal in buses and was greatly delayed by the traffic on Akavish road. Adan had expected the unit to arrive well before dusk but the brigade commander Colonel Uzi Ya'iri only arrived at 10:00 PM, closer to midnight. The rest of his brigade soon arrived, transported by helicopters after the buses had come to a complete standstill.
Paratrooper Effort
Adan met Ya'iri at Adan's former command post. Adan briefly explained the situation and, in a short discussion, Ya'iri laid out his plan. He was tasked with clearing Akavish and Tirtur. At 11:30 the paratroopers began moving, with a battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Yitzhak Mordechai spearheading the advance. Ya'iri, acting with a sense of urgency, had decided to go into action without awaiting sufficient intelligence, or performing adequate reconnaissance on Egyptian defenses. His unit lacked artillery observers and, rather than wait for one to arrive, it was agreed the paratroopers would request fire support of the 162nd Division's command net. The brigade was acting without armor support.
The Israeli "roller bridge", designed to be swiftly deployed on the canal. The fighting at the Chinese Farm meant the bridge had to be towed across the desert rather than on a purpose-built military road, and it reached the canal only after the pontoon bridge had already been deployed.
After some time Mordechai's battalion had reached an area where Tirtur and Akavish were closest, the distance between them no wider than 2 kilometers (1.2 mi). At around 2:45 AM, they came into contact with Abd el-Hamid's left-flank battalion, positioned around Tirtur. The battalion directed effective artillery fire against the paratroopers, who were also receiving heavy machine gun and small arms fire from entrenched Egyptian infantry. The paratroopers attempted to assault the machine gun positions, in places advancing to within a few meters of Egyptian lines. The paratrooper companies spread out, but repeatedly failed to reach the defenses. Israeli artillery fire was ineffective. Egyptian infantry were able to suppress the paratroopers' movement and thwart flanking attempts. Most company and platoon commanders were killed or wounded. Adan ordered Ya'iri to narrow his brigade's front and focus on clearing Akavish instead, but the lead paratrooper battalion was under such heavy fire that it was impossible to maneuver.
With dawn nearing Adan realized that if the pontoon bridge could not be brought to the canal during the few remaining hours of dark, an entire day would pass without a bridge being laid across the canal and in daylight the paratroopers would sustain more casualties. He sent a half-track company to reconnoiter Akavish at 3:00. Half an hour later the company reported it had reached the crossing site without encountering any resistance. The Egyptian battalion fighting the paratroopers had focused all their attention on the Israelis at Tirtur, ignoring activity on Akavish. Adan took a risky decision, sending the irreplaceable pontoons down Akavish to the canal. IDF Bulldozers cleared the road of wreckage and debris and the Israelis reached Fort Lakekan before turning northwards, finally reaching the crossing site. Bridge construction was started immediately by military engineers of the 143rd Division.
At dawn Ya'iri requested approval from Adan to withdraw his brigade, the paratroopers having thus far been unsuccessful in reaching Egyptian lines. Gonen denied the request, approving only medical evacuation for the wounded. This was countermanded after Bar-Lev visited Adan at his command post and realized the gravity of the paratroopers' situation. An armored battalion was tasked with covering the paratroopers but was unable to locate them. The paratroopers released red smoke to pinpoint their position but this backfired as the Egyptians also spotted the smoke, directing accurate artillery fire against them and inflicting further paratrooper casualties. The tanks assaulted the defenses but suffered losses and fell back. It became evident that withdrawal could not be accomplished in the open, APCs and half-tracks were brought up to extract the paratroopers and the wounded—all the while under fire. The Israelis finally withdrew under cover of friendly tanks. In 14 hours of almost uninterrupted combat the paratroopers suffered heavy casualties with some 40–70 killed and 100 wounded. Ya'iri would state that "We had suffered seventy casualties because we went into action too hastily, without proper intelligence on the enemy's defenses." Armored losses sustained during the withdrawal were also heavy.
Egyptian Withdrawal
The Israeli armored brigades, principally those of Nir, Amir and Raviv, continued engaging and attacking the 16th Brigade after the paratroopers were withdrawn. The Israelis concentrated air and artillery attacks against 21st Division's units from 5:00 AM. The Egyptians estimated there were upwards of 80 Israeli tanks attacking their positions. At around 7:00 AM on October 17 the 21st Division received orders to evict Israeli armor from the vicinity of al-Galaa' village and capture Fort Matzmed, as part of a larger Egyptian effort to seal the Israeli penetration and destroy the bridgehead on the west bank. Since Oraby had the 18th Mechanized Brigade in defensive positions and stripped of its tank battalion, and the 14th Brigade defending other parts of the Egyptian bridgehead, he tasked the 1st Brigade to execute the attack with its remaining 53 tanks. At 8:00 AM the Egyptians conducted an air and artillery strike on the area for some fifteen minutes, after which the attack commenced. Egyptian tanks managed to destroy Israeli armor near the village and reached the northern strongpoint of Fort Matzmed just after 9:00 AM, in the face of heavy resistance. However they were soon repelled by Israeli ground fire supported by air strikes. Israeli tanks then counterattacked and managed to advance significantly. The armored battle continued in a see-saw fashion until 9:00 PM, by which time the 1st Brigade had restored its original lines. Meanwhile an attack by one of the 18th Brigade's mechanized infantry battalions on al-Galaa', at 5:00 PM, failed with heavy losses and ten tanks were then allocated to the brigade. Israeli armor had occupied irrigation ditches around the farm and were entrenched in them, which significantly enhanced their defensive position against Egyptian counterattacks. Egyptian attacks directed against the Israeli corridor, or the bridgehead, failed with heavy losses.
The 1st Brigade had just 33 tanks remaining in its inventory after losing 20 tanks. This prompted Second Army command to transfer a battalion of 21 tanks on October 18 from the 2nd Infantry Division to the north to reinforce the dwindling tank numbers in 16th Division's bridgehead. As the battalion moved south a large number of Israeli aircraft attacked the formation. The battalion undertook evasive maneuvers, turning eastwards and fanning out in the desert terrain, thereby avoiding losses. The battalion was then attached to the 21st Division.
Abd el-Hamid meanwhile reported the dire situation of his forces at 5:30 PM on October 17. The 16th Brigade had been in heavy combat for three consecutive days – ammunition was running scarce and the brigade was heavily outnumbered and outgunned due to losses, including the destruction of its artillery units. Abd el-Hamid received orders from 16th Division Headquarters to retreat, his brigade abandoned its Chinese Farms positions and reinforced the lines of the 18th Mechanized Brigade to the north during the night of October 17/18. This finally opened the Tirtur and Akavish roads to Israeli forces, ensuring Operation Abiray-Lev would proceed. Missouri remained in Egyptian hands though, posing a threat to the Israeli corridor to the canal.
Aftermath
At around 4:00 PM on October 17 the pontoon bridge had been fully assembled, opening the first Israeli bridge across the canal. The roller bridge was laid soon after at dawn on October 18 and, by the afternoon, Adan's division crossed to the west bank followed by Kalman Magen's division. Adan, supported by Magen, would go on to reach Suez after the failure of a United Nations ceasefire, thereby cutting off two infantry divisions of the Egyptian Third Field Army. Sharon also crossed with part of his division, simultaneously trying to defend and expand the Israeli corridor to the Suez Canal—as well attacking northwards on the west bank to Ismailia, in an attempt to similarly cut off Second Army. His efforts bogged down and he was unable to reach Ismailia, while attempts to seize critical positions and expand the Israeli corridor on the east bank saw little to no success.
While ultimately an Israeli victory, the Battle of the Chinese Farm has an especially infamous legacy among Israeli participants, and it is remembered as one of the most brutal battles of the war—and for the heavy losses it incurred on both Egyptians and Israelis. After the battle had ended, Dayan visited the area of the battlefield and Reshef, who accompanied him, said "Look at this valley of death." The minister, taken aback by the great destruction before him, muttered in an undertone "What you people have done here!" Later Dayan would recount that: "I am no novice at war or battle scenes, but I have never seen such a sight, not in reality, or in paintings, or in the worst war movies. Here was a vast field of slaughter stretching as far as the eye could see." Sharon would also provide his own poignant account of the aftermath: "It was as if a hand-to-hand battle of armor had taken place... Coming close you could see the Egyptian and Jewish dead lying side-by-side, soldiers who had jumped from their burning tanks and died together. No picture could capture the horror of the scene, none could encompass what had happened there."
The losses suffered by both the Egyptians and the Israelis in the battle were severe. Israeli units suffered heavy casualties in men and equipment; Reshef's armored losses during the first night of the battle alone were comparable to Egyptian armored losses on the disastrous October 14 offensive. For their part, the numbers of Egyptian armored forces within 16th Division's bridgehead severely dwindled. As of 18 October the 21st Armored Division had no more than 40 tanks remaining, of an original 136 tanks available at the start of the battle (not counting 21 tanks received as reinforcements), while the 16th Infantry Division had just 20 tanks remaining in its organic tank battalion. This attrition served Egypt's war strategy of inflicting maximum casualties on the Israelis even though, from another perspective, the initiative had passed to the Israelis during the battle.

MILITARY BATTLES - BATTLE OF HILLI (LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH)


General Description of Military Battles- Battle of Hilli

1.         The battle of Hilli was one of the fiercely fought military battles during the liberation war of Bangladesh.  The battle was fought in two stages, the first one took place on 22 and 23 November 1971 and the second battle took place on 9-11 December 1971.  After the fall of Hilli the Indians had almost a free run up to Bogra.

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Importance of North Western Sector

2.         This Sector was very important strategically because of its location. Siligury corridor, Farakka barrage and Chumbi Valley, a Chinese military base was very close to this Sector.

3.         The waistline linking Hilli with Gaibandha and Phulchari ferry on the Jamuna made this Sector very important. The main thrust of 33 Corps was directed towards Hilli with a view to cut the waistline of North Bengal and seals the area upto Gaibandha. That would cut the Rangpur- Bogra road and isolate the Pakistani 23 Infantry Brigade from rest of the division.

Tactical Importance of Hilli

4.         It is a communication center of great tactical importance.

5.         It is the main gateway to the waistline of north- western sector of Bangladesh and the shortest approach to Ghoraghat and Gaibandha.

6.         It is a nodal point from where roads lead to Bogra, Ghoraghat, Charkai and number of places.

7.         A broad gauge railway line placed through Hilli linking northwest and southwest of Bangladesh.

Pakistani Defense Plan

8.         Pakistan defense was based on strong point. Deployment of Pakistani forces was as follows:

a.         1x company from FFR along with Mujahid Company was deployed in area Basudebpur BOP and Morapara.

b.         1x FFR company was deployed in area Chandipur and Hilli railway station.

c.         1x FFR company at Hilli BOP.

d.         1x FFR company with chaffee tank at Dangapara providing depth.

e.         Noapara was occupied by Rajakars.

Indian Plan

9.         The task of 202 Mountain Brigade was to clear Hilli complex in order to open Axis Hilli-Ghoraghat-Palashbari for 20 Mountain Division.

10.       Their task was later re-defined in terms of capturing only Noapara, Morapara and Basudebpur by using only one battalion. Accordingly 8 guard was tasked and 5 Garwal rifle was kept as brigade reserve.

The Battle

11.       1st Battle.

a.         On 22 November, 2000 hrs, C company of 8 Guards launched attack at Noapara and capr within 2 hours.

b.         A and B Companies launched attack on Morapara. A Company could secure a foothold in the South East part of the village. But B Company faced heavy HMG fire, got severe casualty and only 50 could reach the target.

c.         At this stage, D Company was launched on the same objective and they secured northern and western end of the village Morapara. Situation remained very much confused.

d.         On 23 November, 0500 hours, A Company of 5 Garwal launched attack and capture Basudebpur.

e.         As the day broke out tanks went forward to support but got bogged down in the marshy area. Pakistani forces launched counter attack and all effort to capture Hilli complex failed.

12.       2nd Battle.

a.         On 09 December, one company 22 Marathas infiltrated and occupied Durra. Another coy captured Barachangram.

b.         On 10 December, 4 Rajput attacked Bisapara and captured it with armour. On the same day Indians destroyed some artillery guns by raids at Mahespur.

c.         On 11 December, 4 Rajput again attacked on Baigram and captured it.

d.         By midday of 11 December, 8 Guards attacked Dangapara and Hakimpur and captured it.

Causes of Pakistani Defeat

13.       Causes of defeat were as follows:

a.         Lack of Aggressiveness. The Pakistan defense lacked aggressiveness from the beginning. There was only few counter attack with little or no result and there was almost no aggressive petrol.

b.         Rigidity in Tactics. The Pakistan force did not react to the changed tactical situation. They were still in same concept of holding strong points after first battle once 66 Mountain Brigade captured upto Pirgonj and Noapara, Moraoara, Basudevpur were lost. They could have carried out timely withdraw to the rear and limited offensive could have saved the day.

Lessons learnt

14.       Following lessons can be learnt from defenders point of view:

a.         Provision of Fresh Troops. Fresh troops should be detailed for successive line of defense. But Pakistan forces planned the same troops of forward lines to occupy the successive layers which could not be carried out due to over fatigue and impetus on the part of attackers.

b.         Provision of Strong Mobile Reserve. In any strong point defense concept, strong mobile reserve should be planned and boldly executed which Pakistan forces failed to do.

c.         Aggressiveness in Defense. The defenders were over confident and thought their strong point to be invincible. Instead of carrying out aggressive patrol outside the strong point which would provide early warning and dominations they were glued inside the strong point. Moreover after one position is being overrun Pakistan hardly launched counter attack to recapture the same position.

d.         Righteousness of Cause. Righteousness of cause for war is directly related to the moral of troops which Pakistani force lacked vigorously.

e.         Morale. It is a very essential ingredient for success in any battle. One of the main reasons for Pakistani defeat was their low morale; the troops did not have the faith for the cause to fight.

f.          Popular Support. People had been with liberation forces as they were fighting for the independence of the country. On the contrary Pakistan forces were totally denied of any information, movement of liberation forces being intruder.

g.         Flow of Intelligence. Each and every move and their (Pakistan Force) positions were readily available to allied Army by the local public. The Mukti Bahini guerrillas intimated the latest Information about the enemy activities which facilitated to formulate plans for subsequent operations.

h.         Growing Fear of Insecurity. The Pakistani officers and men were fighting 1200 miles away from their homes and in a hostile land surrounded by a population on which they had perpetuated unheard atrocities and committed the most heinous crimes. Therefore, they were always under constant fear of reprisals from the local population.

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MILITARY BATTLE - OPERATION EXTENDED CAPITAL


General Description of Military Battle - Operation Extended Capital.

1.         Operation Capital was an important military battle of world war-II. With the defeat of Japanese forces in Imphal, the British quest for re-conquest of Burma was pronounced. Accordingly ‘OPERATION CAPITAL’ was made to catch the Japanese on Shwebo plain, a dry and flat plain between the loops of Chindwin and Irrawaddy. Assessing the threat coming on to him, Gen Kimura promptly realized the consequence of fighting the 14th Army at Shwebo plain keeping the river at the back. Kimura, therefore, ordered his 15th Army to withdraw behind Irrawaddy with 31 Japanese Div to cover the withdrawal by establishing itself South West of Mandalay, on the both side of the river.

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2.         Japanese regrouping forced Slim to change his plan and he adopted a revised plan to cross the Irrawaddy and fighting the decisive military battle around Mandalay Meiktila called ‘OPERATION EXTENDED CAPITAL’. The salient features of the plan were:


a.         Cross Irrawaddy in considerable strength throughout its length. 


b.         Fight the major military battle in the plains around Mandalay and in the low hills of Meiktila. 


c.         Crossing the river at more than one place and deceiving the enemy about the real plan. Deceive the enemy so that he is forced to employ his reserve prematurely and thus off balance him by attacking Meiktila.

3.         This was undertaken since 14th Army did not have enough equipment to make strongly opposed cross and to avoid frontal assault against enemy in strength. However, the plan was further illustrated by two other plans such as, ‘HAMMER-ANVIL PLAN’ and a ‘DECEPTION PLAN’.

4.         Hammer-Anvil Plan.           The salient features of the plan were as follows:

a.         33 corps with 19 Indian Division of 4 corps transferred to it, was to cross Irrawaddy in the north and west of Mandalay, thus drawing towards itself the greatest possible concentration of Japanese Division.

b.         Arrange all possible combat indication that Mandalay was the sole objective of 14th Army.

c.         4 Corps was to move secretly from north to south flank through Gangaw valley and cross Irrawaddy at Nyaungu. Thereafter it was to strike violently at Meiktila-Thazi with armour and airborne force.

d.         The intention of this plan was to set the stage for a major battle to crush the Japanese by hammer let loose by 33 corps from north against the anvil established by 4 corps at Meiktila.

5.         Deception Plan.      An elaborate ‘Deception’ was worked out to conceal the move of 4 corps from north to south. The main features of the plan were:

a.         A dummy 4 corps HQ was established at Tamu, using the same wireless channel, whilst the real one moved in complete wireless silence.

b.         19 division was transferred from 4 corps to 33 corps and all signals from 33 corps to 19 division were passed through the dummy 4 corps HQ.

c.         Transfer of 28 African brigade to 4 corps and their leading the advance was to make Japanese believe that 33 corps was advancing towards south.

d.         Movement of Lushai brigade through Gangaw valley was to make Japanese feel that it was only a diversionary force to distract their attention from north.

e.         Indiscreet conversation in clear between the SO and wireless operator was arranged.

f.          Inaccurate statements were made over radio and newspaper and many ingenious devices were employed to mislead the Japanese.

g.         Volume of traffic was made to conform to having both the corps concentrated at Shwebo plain.

h.         Two feint crossing were launched to confuse Japanese forces.

j.          Sherman tanks of 255 tank brigade were camouflaged to depict Lee tanks of 254 brigade to make the Japanese feel the presence of 33 corps in the south.

6.         Conclusion.     OPERATION CAPITAL” was marked as one of the most important plan. Field Marshal Slim in his book ‘Defeat into Victory’ has turned it as the vital thrust. The ‘Hammer-Anvil’ plan along with ‘Deception Plan’ finally sealed the fate of the Japanese in Burma. Capture of Meiktila by the Allies facilitated their early capture of Rangoon. This military battle is an excellent example of Japanese mobilization of troops, irrespective of their trade/service and physical fitness. It was a classic example regrouping the leftover elements of various formations/units and putting them into battle footing for a single mission.

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BACKGROUND AND CAUSES OF BANGLADESH LIBERATION WAR


General


1.         The Liberation war of Bangladesh was more of an evolution rather than a revolution. It was a revolution to save culture, it was a struggle to speak in own language, it was a protest to have ones own right and finally it was a war to save humanity. In recent past time no nation has paid more in such a short time in terms of lives and property. Almost 3 millions have lost their life, 10 millions were routed out from their home and rest of the 60 million was subjected to untold miseries.


2.         It was a crisis, which dates back nearly 30 years and ended in bloody war giving the birth of a new nation in South East Asia, named Bangladesh.

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Background and Causes of Liberation War

3.         The seed for separation was sown at Pakistan’s birth itself. After 200 years of British rule on 14th August 1947 the last Vice-Roy of British India, Lord Mount Batten formally handed over power to Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Nehru to run independent states Pakistan and India. Pakistan consisted of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Punjab, Baluchistan, Sind and East Bengal. As per the Lahore Resolution in 1940, where Mr. Fazlul Haque proposed that, the Northwest and Eastern Zones of India where Muslims were majority should be grouped to federal states of Pakistan in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign. Thus two completely different people were united together in a geographically incongruous union on the principle of common religion. But on ground no amount of true devotion of Islam could serve to bridge the ethnic and cultural distance between the West and the East. As a result in the course of time due to ethnic, cultural and geographical gaps the East and the West had to part with.

4.         However, following were the political milestones to the then East Pakistan, which may be regarded as the main causes of Liberation war:

a.            Language Movement.   The explosion which took place in 25 March 1971 was ignited on 21st February 1952. Mr. Jinnah the first Governor General of Pakistan declared “URDU” to be the state language though 56% of the total population was Bengali speaking and only 7.2% was “URDU” speaking. The decision was bitterly opposed by the Bengalis through literature, protest, rallies and demo. On 21 February students of Dhaka University brought out procession violating Section 144 where many students were killed.

b.            Provincial Election-1954.   In this election the united front of the coalition of Awami League, Krishok Shramik Party, Nezami Islam and the Gonotantrik Dal of the East Wing had the overwhelming majority. Central government in the west could not relish their Victory. Thereby on 30th May 1954 governor’s rule was proclaimed and the provincial legislative assembly was dissolved.

c.            1956 Constitution.   The first constitution of Pakistan was promulgated in 1956. It did not satisfy the people of East Pakistan because it failed to fulfill the basic demand as per Lahore Resolution. It did not allow the Bengali people to represent in the parliament as per popularity. It is to be mentioned here that from 1947 to 1958, seven different governments came successively to power and went - none by ballot box, reflects the cumulative instability.

d.            Marital Law.  In this prevailing political condition President Iskander Mirza declared martial law with his Commander in Chief Ayub Khan as the CMLA on 17 October 1958. Right after 10 days General Ayub Khan wanted to run a tutorial state. But the great obstacle in the way of his desire was the question of Bangali’s autonomy. General Ayub consolidated his position within the government and then his system. The institutions were ‘Basic democracy’ 1962 constitution and participation of the Bengali elite in political decision making and administration. Not a single elite was included in his hard core in the decision making circle except few people of Muslim League, who were disowned by the people of the then East Pakistan in 1954. The Bengalis under the banner of Awami League and National Awami Party-Bhashani, following the defeat in the effort of removing Ayub khan from power through ballot, started nationwide movement for autonomy.

e.            Six Point Programme.  Sheikh Mujibur Rahman launched the famous six-point program in 1966, which aimed at maximum political, economic and administrative autonomy for the then East Pakistan within federal Pakistan. The demands reflected the need to balance the following states:

(1)       The eastern wing, while responsible for 75% of export and foreign earnings, consumed only 20-30% of imported goods.

(2)       Of developed funds, the burgeoning industries of western side, representing 40% of the population, received 77% of the input.

(3)       The disparity between the per-capita income in the West and East was 62% more and steadily increasing every year.

(4)       The price of rice, the staple food of Bengali, was four times as high in East Pakistan as in West Pakistan.

(5)       The prestige service echoed this imbalance in their selection policies. West Pakistan got 94% of the civil svc, 85% of the foreign svc and 95% of the army. The Eastern sector was similarly expended from the benefits of professional levels the service of Agriculture, Education, Medicine, Welfare etc.

(6)       East Pakistan with equal rights and economic parity would, with its larger population and foreign earnings, have been dominant over the West. This potential situation, proposed and outlined in the six-point programme, was in intolerable threat to the military and ruling elite of West Pakistan.

f.             Agartala Conspiracy and Trial.    In January 1968 the Government accused and arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 28 civilian and military personnel of having participated in an alleged conspiracy to separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan with Indian Help. The attempt was boomeranged on the central regime.

g.            Popular Turmoil in 1969.   In the spring of 1969 President Ayub Khan, after a six months period of mounting popular turmoil, was ousted and General Yahya Khan, without noticeable reluctance, came forward to take his place.

h.            1970’s Election.  General Yahya Khan arranged general election in 1970 (17 December). Awami league scored overwhelming victory in this election, out of 307 seats Awami league scored 167 seats. On the other hand of eastern provincial assembly Awami league scored 298 seats out of 310.

j. Non-cooperation Movement.  Under these circumstances Mr. Bhutto the leader of Pakistan People’s Party declined to participate in the national assembly unless some modification was made by Sheikh Mujib regarding 6 point issue. When on 01 March 1971 announcement of Yahya Khan came over radio, indefinitely postponing the opening of National Assembly scheduled on 03rd March 1971, the people of the then East Pakistan were stressed. This breach of faith at the last moment was the supreme act of treachery. Sheikh Mujib called for a general strike to begin on 2nd March 1971. It received response from all corners of Bangali Nation and people joined in civil disobedience move. On 7th March 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman addressed a huge mass and delivered his historical speech at Dhaka Racecourse ground. Now the Bangali people were convinced that Yahya Khan would not hand over the power to the Bengali dominated government. Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib an all out non-co-operation mov started. All high court judges, high civil officials, Schools, Colleges stopped functioning. In simple word Sheikh Mujib became the defector ruler of the then East Pakistan.

k.            Last Phase Before the Start of the War.   To soften up the situation General Yahya Khan came to Dhaka with his advisers. Negotiation continued, everybody was hoping for peace but the General had something otherwise in his mind. By now he decided to teach a bloody lesson to the Bangalis. But he did not have adequate force to meet the requirement. So in the name of negotiation he was buying time. On night 25/26 General Yahya left Dhaka giving the infamous order to Tikka Khan , “Sort them out”. They attacked all the residential halls of Dhaka University, Rajarbagh Police Line, EPR HQ at Pilkhana and EBRC. The so-called best army in South East Asia started killing all the innocent people without any hesitation. Thus the first drop of blood of the martyr wrote the word BANGLADESH.

Conclusion.



5.         The victory of the people of Bangladesh was a victory of ideals and national spirit. The victory brought freedom of Bangladesh but left millions dead and wounded millions homeless and misery ridden. If blood is the price of liberty, BANGLADESH has certainly overpaid.


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MILITARY BATTLES - BATTLE OF BELONIA BULGE (LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH)


General Description of Military Battles- Battle of Belonia Bulge
Figure-1: Military Battles-Location of Belonia

            1.         The Battle of the Belonia Bulge was one of the major and successful military battles of the Bangladesh Liberation Army. The battle was fought between the Pakistan Army and the Allied forces on 02 November- 07 November 1971. The prime contributor to the success of this battle was 10 East Bengal which was raised newly from the Sector-2 troops.

Figure-2: Military Battles-Sector-2


            Composition and Disposition of Forces

            2.         Pakistani Forces.

                       a.         15 Baluch Regiment deployed one coy each at Belonia, Porshurum, Amjadhat and Salder Bazar. Battalion HQ was located at Feni.

                       b.         EPCAF deployed one company each at west of Belonia, Gutuma and Jamua.

Figure-3: Military Battles-Deployment of Pakistani Forces

            3.        Allied Forces.

                      a.         Bangladesh task force consisted of 10 East Bengal, one company of 2 East Bengal and Sector 1 troops.

                      b.         Indian Army had 3 Dogra Regiment, 2 Rajput Regiment and Divisional Artillery of 23 Mountain Division.

Figure-4: Military Battles-Deployment of Allied Forces

            The Plan and Task of Allied Force
Figure-5: Military Battles-Allied Plan

4.        Bangladesh Forces.    The plan was to cut the Pakistan troops in the Bulge from north to south along Chandana- Salia- Gutuma line and forced them to surrender. To execute the plan the assigned task was allotted for the forces as under:

                      a.         10 East Bengal was to infiltrate through the gaps from the western border along line Chandana-Salia-Gutuma and dig-in overnight.

Figure-6: Military Battles-Allied Attack

                      b.         Troops to be deployed facing the enemy from both front and rear.   

                      c.         Troops of sector-1 to infiltrate from the eastern border through Gutuma and linked up with 10 East Bengal.

                      d.         Seal northern part of the bulge and trap enemy located in the area.

                      e.         Ensure that no troops from the north escape to the South nor they are reinforced from the south.

5.        Indian Forces.     Their task was to attack and clear the remnants if the besieged Pakistani troops would not go for automatic surrender after 3-4 days.

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Conduct of the Battle

6.        On 07 October, detail reconnaissance and briefing was carried out. One JCO of the reconnaissance party was injured by mine during reconnaissance.

7.        On night 2/3 November, 10 East Bengal infiltrated through Chandana- Salia- Gutuma line, completed defense facing north and south by 030630 November. At the same time one Pakistani railway trolley was ambushed.
Figure-7: Military Battles-Mukti Bahini Infiltration on 2/3 November


8.        Pakistani forces started heavy firing and tried to break through during night 3/4 November but failed.

9.        On 04 November, Pakistani forces carried out massive air strike. One HMG was destroyed. Next day also, air strike continued and they tried to break through but failed.

10.      On night 5/6 November, one fighting petrol of 20 person went for recce of Salder Bazar and was ambushed. One company of 10 East Bengal launched attack and captured Salder Bazar by 1st light 06 November. By afternoon, one company from 2 Rajput reinforced the position at Salder Bazar.
Figure-8: Military Battles-10 East Bengal Attack on Salder Bazar

11.      On night 6/7 November, 3 Dogra launched attack on Belonia and Porshuram with artillery support and captured it by 1st light 07 November. One officer and 42 other ranks of Pakistani forces surrendered.
Figure-9: Military Battles-Attack of 3 Dogra Regiment

Lessons Learnt

12.      Following lessons can be drawn from this battle:

a.         Need For Detail Reconnaissance at All Level.    A detail reconnaissance up to minimum level of a section helps in achieving success.

b.         Inclement Weather Helps in Achieving Surprise by Infiltration.    An unfavorable weather condition helps in achieving surprise for Infiltration troops.

c.         Need for Reserve at All Times.    Strong reserve should be maintained to eject out any sort of unforeseen situation under centralized command.

d.         Need for Mutual Support and Petrol to Cover the Gaps.    Infantry should be deployed mutually supported. Should there be a big gap must be covered by aggressive petrol.

e.         Popular Support.    For any war popular support is required. Pakistan Army lost the popular support due to their misconduct with the local population.

f.          Need For Bold and Imaginative Planning.   Infiltration played a contributory factor for the success of subsequent operation.

g.         Effect of Moonlit Night.   During the infiltration the liberation force correctly exploited the dark hours of moon since it was on 3rd quarter.


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