MILITARY BATTLES - GOLAN HEIGHTS/ SYRIAN FRONT

1.         General.        Syria simultaneously with Egyptian launched its offensive against Israel in Golan Heights Front at 1400 hours on 06 October 1973. Though Syria attained some initial success with its superiority of forces, ultimately could not continue the momentum in front of Israeli Counter attack. Finally, Syrian was defeated in the Golan Height front.

Figure-1: Military Battles- Location of Golan Heights

2.         Golan Heights.        The Golan Heights was occupied by Israel since 1967. It is 65 kilometers from north to south with a maximum width of 30 kilometers. Towards north is Mount Hermon and towards south is Yarmukh Valley. An irregular North-South line also known as ‘Purple Line’ constituted the eastern boundary. Purple Line is the 1967 cease-fire line, which became border between Syria and Israeli occupied territory.

Figure-2: Military Battles- Golan Heights

3.         Syrian Preparations for Offensive.        Since Syria was determined to recapture the Golan Heights from Israel by force, therefore it started taking preparation since 1967. The preparations were as under:

a.         1st Line of Defense.           From 1967 to 1973, the Syrians had constructed an elaborate defense system comprising numerous fortifications east of ‘Purple Line’. Three Syrian brigades constantly manned this line.

Figure-3: Military Battles- Purple Line

b.         2nd Line of Defense.         Further east of Purple Line another line was built up at SASSA Ridge midway between Kuneitra and Damascus. Some mechanized, tank and infantry units were in the 2nd line of defense by September 1973.

Figure-4: Military Battles- 2nd Line of Defense

4.         Syrian Offensive Plan.      The Syrian plan was strongly influenced by Soviet doctrine. The offensive was to commence with a short but intensive use of firepower, delivered by artillery, tanks, mortar and air. The overall plan was as under:

a.         Simultaneous multiple break through by three mechanized infantry divisions in the north, center and south towards west in the first echelon of attack.

b.         This breakthrough would be exploited by the follow up armoured division in the 2nd echelon of attack.

c.         Whole operation would be conducted under cover of Anti Air gun, missile, artillery barrage and Close Air Support.

d.         Syria planned to recapture all or most of the Golan Heights by this offensive.

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5.         Syrian Deployment for Offensive.          To accomplish her ambitious plan, Syrian forces were deployed prior to the operations as under:

a.         7 Mechanized Infantry Division was in the north of Kunietra- Damascus road.

b.         9 Mechanized Infantry Division was in the center opposite to Kunietra.

c.         5 Mechanized Infantry Division was in the SE of Rafid and north of Yarmuk valley.

d.         Each of the Syrian Division had an armoured brigade attached with it.

e.         3 Armoured Division was between Katana and Saassaa.

f.          1 Armoured Division was in South East of Saassaa.

g.         In no case, both the armoured divisions to be committed. One of them was to be held in reserve in the event of failure or unexpected development.

h.         600 artillery pieces, 400 Anti Air guns and more than 100 SAM batteries with 400 to 500 launchers were positioned to support the operation.

Figure-5: Military Battles- Syrian Offensive Plan

6.         Israeli Defense Plan.          In Golan Height front, the Israeli defense plan was as under:

a.         Thinly held the entire frontier mainly with armour units. Electronic equipment and Radar station were established to continuously monitor the movement of Syrian force.

b.         In case of any Syrian offensive, the reserve will be called to reinforce this front.

c.         Israeli superior Air Force will do the rest.

7.         Israeli Deployment.

           a.        Israeli 2 X infantry brigades thinly deployed with their obstacle sys along the Purpel Line.

           b.         Barak Armoured Brigade deployed in between Kunietra and Rafid along the obstacle sys.

c.         Besides, 11 self-propelled field artillery batteries were also deployed.

Figure-6: Military Battles- Israeli Deployment

8.         The Battle.    At 1400 hours on 06 October 73, the artillery barrage started for next fifty minutes. Syrian columns moved out in a broad front with their leading brigade and cross the cease-fire line. Antitank ditches were filled up at certain places and vehicles could cross. Infantry were moving well ahead with Antitank/ ATGM. Israelis were taken by complete surprise. The subsequent development of battle was as follows:

           a.       Syrian Attack (06 October).

                      (1)       7 Infantry Division, at the northern corridor initially bypassed the town of Kuneitra and moved towards TAP lin. (One of the brigade crossed the Antitank ditches and advanced through an open space which was the Israelis killing area and lost 60 tanks and fell back to the line of Antitank ditches.)

(2)       9 Infantry Division at the center bypassed toward Israeli positions about 10 miles south of Kuneitra and swept through the Kudna Gap.  

(3)       5 Infantry Division, at the southern corridor moved through the Rafid Gap and advanced further 10 miles south along the Tapeline road towards Juhader. 

(4)       The Israeli position on Mount Hermon was cleared by two successive heliborne assaults by 500 rangers. An attempt to recapture the position by Israeli brigade was repulsed.

Figure-7: Military Battles- Syrian Attack

b.         Syrian Consolidation & Israeli Advance (07 October).                   

(1)       7 Infantry Divisions moved towards the position of Mount Hermon. Two unsuccessful brigade attacks were launched and the formation was held up before Mount Hermon position. Another brigade pushed towards Massada road, but had to withdraw being without infantry support.

(2)       A Moroccan Infantry Brigade at the foothills of Hermon refused to advance. Other formations, like Druze was also non-cooperative. Even a Syrian Infantry Brigade also refused to advance. All these prevented any further progress on the northern front.  

(3)       Realizing the initial success on the southern corridor, Syrians pushed 1 Armoured Division through Rafid Gap. By noon one of its brigades pushed north along the Tapeline road and reached Naffek (the Israeli HQ position) and engaged Israeli 79 Armoured Brigade.

(4)       By 1700 hours on 07 October, 5 Infantry Divisions achieved significant progress.  One of its brigades had stopped at 800 yards from El Al and another brigade was on Yehudia road less than six miles from the lake.

(5)       The advance of Syrian column halted, owing to the stretched Line of Communication. If the Syrians would have not stopped at 1700 hours, they could have reached the rim of the escarpment, perhaps even the river Jordan.

c.         Israeli Counter Attack (08-10 October).

(1)       At night of 07 October, taking the advantage of Syrian halt, Israelis pushed Syrian 5 Infantry Division and two Syrian attacks were successfully beaten back. By 08 October, three Israeli divisions led by Eyton, Laner & Paled, started operating and achieved moderate success.

(2)       IAF came into action from 09 October and under cover of massive air strikes, Israeli field formations could successfully push back the Syrians upto the 'Purple Line'. 14, 19 and 20 Armoured Brigade broke through the Syrian defensive positions.

(3)       On 10 October, under Israeli pressure, Syrians withdraw to Saassa line.

Figure-8: Military Battles- Israeli Counter Attack

d.         Adv towards Damascus (11-14 October).       

                        (1)       The Israeli plan was as under:

(a)       On 11 October, Eiton’s and Laner’s Divisions were to drive towards North East. Peled Division was to consolidate on the Purple Line.

(b)       Eiton’s Division, on the right, would initially make the main effort, but once a breakthrough was made, Laner would exploit.

(2)       From 11 to 14 October, the Israeli forces pushed into Syria, conquering a further 20 square mile box of territory. From there, they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, which was only 40 km away.

(3)       Combined Syrian, Iraqi & Jordanian counter attacks prevented any further Israeli gains.

9.   Reasons for Failure of Syrians.

           a.         Lack of Discipline.   On 07 October, after initial success in the Majd al Shams area Moroccan infantry brigade, Druze infantry formation and one Syrian brigade refused to obey order and did not react to the instructions. This lack of discipline was one of the drawbacks.

b.         Lack of Flair for Battle in Senior Rank. The middle grade and junior officers fought with great bravery and tenacity but the flair for battle with the senior ranks were seemed to be lacking.           

c.         The Momentum of Attack.            A high level decision was taken to stop advance when the column was near escarpment, if Syrian columns would not stopped at 1700 hours with still one hour day light left, they could have reached the escarpment or even Jordan river with the momentum. The Syrian decided to advance again but missed their initial opportunity.

d.         Tank Madness.       Syrians were affected by tank madness pinned their faith on armoured which was at great disadvantage in the Golan plateau. That to the infantry disobedient made the situation more difficult.

e.         Tactical Lapses.     Soviet advice for the Syrians was to crash across the cease fire line with their armoured divisions in the lead and then to pen the gaps with their infantry divisions. General Tlas did it the other way round, with costly result.

f.          Influence of 1967 Defeat.      This psychological effect contributed to a decision to halt on 07 October.

g.         Suspicious Role of Jordan.         Jordan only sent a token force to the Syrian side of the Golan Heights to show his concern for Arab solidarity, but kept his own front with Israel completely quiet during the war. Israel was thus able to leave a skeleton force of a mere 28 tanks on the Jordan river boundary, enabling Israel's Army and Air Force to concentrate on the Syrian and Egyptian threats.

Lessons Learnt

10.       Arab-Israeli war gives out some of the very important lessons to the students of the military history. The lessons to be learnt from this campaign are:

a.         Deception Plan is a Prerequisite for Successful Attack.      Sadat achieved a total political, strategic and tactical surprise through a deliberate deception plan.

b.         Surprise must be Achieved to Fight against a Superior Army.                  Achievements of surprise, which should be cardinal to all planning and execution.

c.         Wage of War in the Most Improbable Time.    Ramadan, on the part of the muslims & the time of Yom Kippur, for the Jews, and other important considerations such as the tide of the canal and condition of moon etc bought the Egyptians surprise.

d.         Super Strong but Static Nature of Defense should not be Blindly Relied Upon.  No defense line is impregnable whatever may be its strength. The IDF is known for stubbornness but the Bar Lev Line gave in under the great Egyptian pressure.

e          Rapid Mobilization can Save the Sovereignty of a Nation.     The Israelis were ever ready to go into battle. The Yom Kippur celebration or the fact that they were not militarily prepared, did not delay them a minute from going straight into the battles. The Arabs perhaps are more pragmatic and hesitant in their mobility.

f.          No Army is Invincible Whatever may be their Strength.      This war proved that, whatever may be the potentials of the IDF they can be humbled. The initial Arab military success clearly showed that IDF are not as foolproof as they were thought to be, prior to 1973.

g.         Intelligence Failure can Handicap a Superior Force.           The Arab achieved strategic surprised in the first phase of the battle, because of the Israeli intelligence failure.

h.         Initial Success Must be Exploited.                     It may be said that, once a foot-hold had been secured across the canal, and an opportunity had existed (even deviation from the political goal), effort should have been made for exploiting the situation by advancing into Sinai with armour and speed.

j.          Need for Improvisation.    The Egyptian engineers used improvised method to make crossing places on both sides of the Suez Canal which considerably reduced the time require for launching offensive.

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