MILITARY BATTLES - ARAB-ISRAEL WAR 1973

1.         General.   The war took place between Israel and Arab countries coalition led by Egypt and Syria from 06 October to 24 October 1973. Egypt and Syria initiated the conflict to regain territory that Israel had occupied since the Six Day War of 1967. Use of most modern and sophisticated weapon/equipment and involvement of superpower’s interest made it one of the most significant war since World War-II.

Figure-1: Military Battles-Map of War Place

2.         Causes of the War.

a.         Recapture of Lost Territory.          Egypt and Syria failed to solved the territory dispute with Israel. Israel did not return the Sinai to Egypt and Golan Height to Syria. Therefore, Egypt and Syria planed to recapture the lost territories.

Figure-2: Military Battles-Recapture of Lost Territory

b.         Israeli Reluctance in Negotiation.                   Israelis General Staff thought that Israel was safe from Arab attack for the indefinite future. Therefore, Israel was reluctant for negotiation felt no reason to return the territory to Egypt and Syria. This reluctance caused Egypt to think that 'what has been taken by force has to be regained by force'.

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c.         Creation of International Environment for Dialogue.    To create a sit favorable for a dialogue between the Israel and super powers through attaining limited military objective.

d.         Economical Burden due to War of Attrition.       War of attrition against Israel from 1968 to 1970 compelled Egypt of purchase huge amount of armament from Soviet Union on long payment loan basis and this caused heavy burden on Egyptian economy. To recover her economy, the rich oil field in Sinai will be a great help for Egypt. Therefore Egypt planned to attack Israel.

e.         National Will and Morale.        Consecutive losses in war against Israel deepened Arab sorrowness. Specially the morale of troops of Arab Army and people were down. Therefore, Anwar Sadat attempting to be a leader of the Arab world, felt to shade the humiliating losses of 1967 and this caused the war of 1973.

f.          Training and Reorganization of Egypt Army.         Egyptian Army was no match with the Israel Defense Force (IDF) in terms of training and armaments. Therefore, after receiving enough modern armaments from USSR like, MIG-23, SAM-6, RPG-7, Sagger, ATGM and proper training, he reorganized the Egyptian Army. When Egypt found that it's Army came to a tactical parity with the IDF, then Egypt started taking preparation for war against Israel.

g.         Ambition of Syria.       Hafiz-al Asad the head of Syria had a different view. He has little interest in negotiation and felt retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. Since the six-day war, Asad had made a massive military buildup and hoped to make Syria the dominant power in Arab world by defeating Israel in war. Therefore, Asad thought with the help of Egypt, Syria can attain her aim. 

SINAI/EGYPTIAN FRONT

3.         Egyptian Preparation for the War.

a.         At strategic level.       To prepare a plan and execute that, Egyptian took the following strategic prep:

(1)       Replacing Minister of War.         As the minister of war Sadek was not ready to execute the plan code named "Granite 1" to recapr Sinai, he was dismissed and General Ahmed Ismailai was in the same line with Anwer Sadat amended Granite-1 into Granite- 2 to recapture Sinai.

Figure-3: Military Battles-Replacing Minister of War

(2)       New Doctrine.           New doctrine in the Egypt Army provided motivation and hatred of the enemy and for "Liberation of the sacred lands".

(3)       Training of Egyptian Army.          An intensive and goal dir training program was introduced. The units were trained in their specific tasks under Granite-2 and large scale exercise were conducted by GHQ for the Egyptian Second and Third Army.

(4)       Deception.       One of the important factors was deception in Egyptian preparation Egypt only worked secretly with Syria to achieve surprise and strategic advantage against Israel.

b.         At Tactical Level.             Following preparation were taken by Egyptian at tactical level:

(1)       Air Defense.     With Soviet assistancet the Egyptian had built one of the strongest Anti Air system in the world to neutralize Israeli Air Force.  

(2)       Antitank Missile.          Egyptian Armed Forces and particularly infantry were equipped with an abundance of antitank weapon like Sagger, man portable wire guided antitank missile, RPG, antitank RL, missile etc to neutralize Israeli strong armour.

(3)       Construction of "Irish Bridge".              Many "Irish Bridge" below water level were completed along with Sweet Water Canal to enable smooth traffic to Suez Canal.

(4)       Construction of Ramparts.            Along the canal they erected 86 ramparts, each 30m high, to enable observation and direct fire across the canal.

(5)       Construction of Road.            Dozens of approached road to the canal were constructed to bring the forces near the canal easily.

4.         Egyptian Operation Plan.   The Egyptian Offensive was planed in 3 phases:

Figure-4: Military Battles-Egyptian Operation Plan, Phase-1

a.         Phase-1.     2nd and 3rd Army was to attack with their 5 X infantry divisions to secure a brH 10-12 km deep and be ready to continue the attack.

Figure-5: Military Battles-Egyptian Operation Plan, Phase-2

b.         Phase-2.    The armoured and mechanized divisions would pass these infantry divisions to penetrate Mitla and Gidi  passes and retake the West Sinai.

   

Figure-6: Military Battles-Egyptian Operation Plan, Phase-3

c.         Phase-3.     Establishment of strong defensive position after successful completion of Phase-2. The infantry divisions would move forward to replace the armoured and mechanized forces that would withdraw.

5.         Egyptian crossing Plan.           The Egyptian crossing plan had following features to negotiate Bar-Lev line:

a.         At first infantry units to cross using raft/boats of protect engineer for their uninterrupted work.

           b.         Setting of heavy bridges for armour and light bridges for infantry.

           c.         Sand shelters were prepared in west bank for the protection of crossing.

           d.         Nearly 2000 km roads were made for increased maneuver.

           e.         Engineers were also used to prepare artillery firing position including Anti Air in either side of the canal.

f.          Huge number of fire positions were also prepared in west bank for protection of crossing.

           g.         Employment of Commando.         All the divisions were given with a commando battalion to cover the crossing and advance by occupying important defiles. 

h.         Engineers Contributions in the Canal crossing Operation.        In the first two hours the number of military engineers cross the canal exceeded 15000. Their most important task was to cut gaps in the Israeli sand ramparts. The contributions were as follows:

(1)       With second wave, 80 engineer units cross over and powerful water pumps were put into operation.

(2)       The high velocity water jets of these pumps quickly sliced gaps in the sand bank. The purpose was to wear down the bank, as rapidly as possible to make them passable initially for amphibious vehicle and finally to be used as ferries and bridge sites.

(3)       About 8 such gaps were created and engineers started to fix the floors of these passages which had turned into mud one meter deep in some areas.

(4)       Various material and equipment were used to make the surface hard, firm and dry road beds on which tanks and other vehicles could move steadily.

(5)       The engineers could open up some gaps within two hours from starting their week.

(6)       With a surprising speed and within 9 hours they made 60 gaps, 10 bridges and 60 ferries. Two general type of bridge were also laid.

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6.         Deployment Of Egyptian Force Prior to the Crossing.           To accomplish their operation, the Egyptian Force was deployed in following manner prior to the crossing operation:

            a.         Second Army.           The second Army consisted of 3 X infantry divisions (2, 16, 18), 1 X armour division (21) and 1 X mechanized division (23) was deployed between the Mediterranean sea and the southern edge of the Great Bitter Lake, the area between Quantara in the north to Devessoir in the south.

            b.         Third Army.    Third Army comprised of 2 X infantry divisions (7, 19) 1X armour division (4) and 1X mechanized division (6). This Army was deployed in between the southern edge of the Great Bitter Lake and the head of the Gulf of Suez.

Figure-7: Military Battles-Deployment Of Egyptian Force Prior to the Crossing

7.         Israeli Defense Plan and Deployment. 

            a.         Defense Plan.       The Israeli Sinai def plan was based on operational plan "SHOVACH YONIM" which called for the Bar Lev out post line along the canal. This line was to be reinforced by armour in the event of an attack. The plan was as under:

(1)       First use of the regular army in the line to cause attrition and delay the crossing.

                      (2)       To the end it will be reinforced with tanks. infantry and artillery units.

Figure-8: Military Battles-Israeli Defense Plan and Deployment

            b.         Israeli Deployment.        Prior to the Egyptian crossing, Israeli one division was deployed along Bar Lev Line called Sinai Division commander by General Mandler. Their deployment was as under:

(1)       Two infantry brigade was deployed, mostly guarding the strong points on the Bar Lev Line.

(2)       Their armour brigade was depl oyedall along the canal bank mainly in Quantara, Chinese firm and at the south of Great Bitter Lake. 

Development of Battle

8.         Egyptian Attack (06 October).

Figure-9: Military Battles- Egyptian Attack

a.         At about 1400 hours on 06 October , 250 air craft took off and carried out attack on Bar Lev Line strong holds, COMCEN, three air bases, ten HAWK SAM missile sites and artillery position etc.

b.         Fire from 1850 artillery guns was delivered on the east bank.

c.         Infantry and commando crossed the canal on raft/rubber boats.

d.         Then engineers started to wash out sand banks with the help of water pump. Within 9 hours they made 60 gaps, 10 bridges and 60 ferries.

e.         Over night, the Egyptian put across 500 to 700 tanks, large number of heavy equipment, trucks, cannon, APC etc.

f.          By morning of 08 October, they were in defense position as planned. Infantry in the front, mechanized in the middle and armoured in the rear.

9.         Israeli Initial React.

a.         In the northern Sector, Major General Adan began to arrive.

b.         In the southern Sector, Major General Sharon arrived on 07 October.

10.       Israeli Counter attack (Battle of FIRDAN) and Egyptian Consolidation (08 to 13 October).

a.         To neutralize the Egyptian commando operations, a mechanized task force was raised under Brigadier General Magen in the north and under Major General Sharon in the southern sector.

b.         The first major IDF Counter attack was launched by two battalions of a brigade of General Adan division on 08 October.

c.         The leading battalion had initial success but ambushed by Egyptian infantry.

d.         Egyptian destroyed two armoured units on that day.

e.         During 11 to 13 October, two Egyptian armoured division moved across the canal.

11.       Egyptian 2nd Attack (14 October).

Figure-10: Military Battles- Egyptian 2nd Attack

a.         On 14 October morning, 2nd and 3rd Army launched their major offensive.       

b.         The 3rd army attack towards Mitla pass with its secondary attack towards Gidi pass.

c.         The Israeli defeated the attacks with heavy Egyptian casualty.

12.       Israeli Counter offensive/ Canal crossing : Operation Gazelle (15 to 17 October).

Figure-11: Military Battles- Operation Gazelle

a.         On 15 October night, one armoured brigade fought the way to the planned crossing site.

b.         Sharon Division crossed the canal on 160200 October.

c.         Sharon split his force into raiding parties and sent them to search and destroy the SAM sites. There raiders destroyed 4 X SAM sites which allowed IAF an air corridor to operate.

d.         On 17 October, Adan’s Division ambushed 25 Independent Armoured Brigade from front and right flank.

13.       Isolation of 3rd Army (18 to 17 October).

Figure-12: Military Battles- Isolation of 3rd Army

a.         On 18 and 19 October, bridges were launched and Israeli forces started crossing.

b.         On 20 October, Sharon tried to capture Ismilia but was fiercely beaten back by Egyptians.

c.         On 19 October, Adan’s division attack westward and then south and capture Genifer Hill.

d.         Cease fire was imposed on 22 October and by then Adan and Magen occupied 20-30 km west of the canal.

e.         On 23 October night, Adan reached the outskirt of the Suez City thus isolating the 3rd Army from Egypt towards west.

14.       Reasons for Failure of the Egyptian

a.         Initial Aim and Training.               Egyptian initial aim was limited to recapture the Sinai desert. The soldiers were rained for initial part of the operation and they performed excellent. They were not trained much for the mobile operation at the later stage.

b.         Lack of Flexibility.    When the further offensive plan was executed the whole affairs went out of hands as Egyptian field formations were not flexible to switch over to the mobile warfare.

c.         Lack of Coordination.          The formation commanders had little coordination with the flanking formation thereby it created gap between the two armies.

d.         Poor Passage of information.         The passage of information was very poor and the react to any unexpected situation was slow. When Sharon's Division crossed the canal and got inside the Egyptian territory, Egyptian did not know about it and was surprised.

e.         Lack of Adequate Reserve.       Egyptian did not have much reserve in the home bank of the Suez Canal thereby after crossing the canal Israeli got the freedom of act.

f.          Inferiority of Air Force.         Inferiority of air force was another cause. As the armoured and infantry troops went out of their air defense cover they became vulnerable to the Israeli Air Force.

How Surprise was Planned and Achieved by Arab Forces (Deception Plan)

15.       Detail plan was made by the Arab forces to achieve both strategic and tactical surprise in the battle. Few of the lapses of Israeli also contributed to their success.

a.         Israeli Complacency on the Eve of War.     In mid 1973, Israeli military intelligence was almost aware of Arab war plan. But Israeli analysts did not believe that. After 1967 war, they started believing themselves invincible and Arabs would not be able to overcome Israel for time being. This idea was created due to Arab political military deception.

b.         Political Deception by Arabs.        

(1)         President Anwar Sadat frequently and publicly declared his intention to attack Israel number of times. On the other hand, Egyptian ministers held talks expressing their peaceful intentions to Western governments.

(2)         Syria also engaged in political deception but to a lesser extend. Radio Damascus announced on 04 October that President Asad would begin a nine day tour of Syria’s eastern province on 10 October.

c.         Military Deception Plan.     Egyptian military deception plan was more effective. Those were nicely planned and executed in the following ways:

(1)         On 04 October 73, the Egyptian media reported that 20,000 reservists had been demobilized.

(2)         Reports were given instructing cadets in Mil College to resume their courses on 09 October.

(3)         Officers were allowed to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca.

(4)         Immediately before the assault, on the morning of 06 October, the Egyptian deployment special squads of troops along the canal. Their tasks were to move about without helmets, weapon or shirt, and to swim, hang out fishing lines and eat oranges.

(5)         The Egyptian carried out a number of crossing exercise over Suez without making any formidable crossing of the canal. By September 73, Egyptian conducted as many as 41 such exercises, none of which turned out to be a real threat to the Israelis.

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