General
1. The battle
of Yarmuk was fought between the Romans and Muslims from 14 -20 August 636 AD
on the northern plains of river Yarmuk, located on the southern part of present
Syria. The Romans had a disastrous defeat in this battle which spelled the end
of Roman rule in Syria and signature the rise of Islam.
Preparations by the Romans
2. Concentrations
by the Romans. In late
635 AD, while Emessa was under siege, Heraclius began preparing for this great maneuver.
By May 636, an army of 150,000 men had been put under arms and concentrated in
the area of Antioch and in parts of Northern Syria. This powerful military
force consisted of contingents of Russians, Slavs, Franks, Romans, Greeks,
Georgians, Armenians and Christian Arabs.
3. Strength
and Compositions of Troops. The
Roman force was organized into five armies under five commands, each of about
30,000 men. Mahan, King of Armenia was appointed Commander in Chief of entire
imperial army. Other commanders were:
(a) Qanateer – Russian prince who commanded
all the Russian and Slavs.
(b) Gregory – Commander European troops.
(c) Dierjan – Commander European troops.
(d) Jabla – King of Ghassan Arabs, commander
the Arab Christian troops.
(e) Mahan – King of Armenia, commander the
Armenian troops.
4. Roman
Strategy. At that time, the
Muslims were dissipating in four groups in four places (Syria, Jordan, Northern and Southern Palestine) without
mutual support and reserve. Each of their corps could be attacked in turn without
the least chance of fighting a successful battle. And this situation was fully
exploited by Heraclius in his plan.
5. Concept
of Roman Operation. Considering
the Muslim dissipate deployment as advantage, Heraclius set his Concept of Operation.
His concept was:
a. Since the Muslim forces were located at
four different places without mutual support and reserve, they can be destroyed
in piecemeal by simultaneous attack.
b. Muslim Army would be destroyed at
Emessa by a force of 10 times its size, attack from all direction with its
escape route sealed.
c. Caesarea was reinforced by sea; this
force was organized to tie down Yazeed and his besieging corps, not allowing him to join his comrades.
d. Then Imperial army would advance while
the gar of Caesarea
would advance from the coast and attack remaining Muslim corps concentrated
against each corps in overwhelming strength.
6. Roman
Plan. Caesarea, which was under the Roman
control was reinforced by sea and built upto a strength of 40,000 men to tie
down Yazeed not allowing him to join his comrades. Rest of the Army would operate
on following plan:
a. Qanateer would move along the coastal route
upto Beirut, then approach Damascus from the east and cut off Abu Ubeida.
b. Jabla would march from Aleppo on the
direct route to Emessa via Hama, and hold the Muslims frontally in the Emessa
region. The Christian Arabs would be the first to contact the Muslims.
c. Deirjan would move between the coast
and the Aleppo road and approach Emessa from the west, thus striking the
Muslims in their flank while they were held frontally by Jabla.
d. Gregory would advance on Emessa from
the North East and attack the Muslims in there right flank at the same time as
they were struck by Deirjan.
e. The army of Mahan would advance behind
the Christian Arabs and act as reserve.
Preparation by the Muslims
7. Collection
of Intelligence by the Muslims. Khalid could come to know from a Roman prisoner of war
about the plan and preparation of Heraclius. The Muslims had established
an excellent intelligence system in the land and no major movement or concentration
of enemy force remained concealed.
8. Threat
Analysis by Khalid. As days lengthened in to weeks, the
pieces of intelligence brought by the Gents gave out the clear picture of
Romans direction of move, its strength and threat. Khalid with his absolute sense
of strategy saw the design of Heraclius
and advised Abu Ubeida to pull back Muslims troops from north and central Syria,
as well as from Palestine and concentrate all four crops at a strategic place
to fight a decisive defensive battle and wear out the enemy.
9. Muslims Plan. Khalid with his unerring sense of
strategy visualized how terribly vulnerable the Muslims Army were at Emessa and
Sheizar. He suggested to withdraw to Yarmuk to fight a decisive battle. The war
council agreed to his proposal. The final decision to counter the Roman plan
was as under:
a. Khalid was made overall tactical commander for the battle.
b. Amr-bin-al-Aas, Yazeed and Shurahbeel were ordered to give
up their territory and join the main force at Yarmuk.
c. A strong regiment of Yazeed’s corps was to remain at
Caesarea to contain the Roman gar there.
10. TRD
by the Muslim Force. Abu
Ubeida ordered the TRD of the army to Jabiya, which was the junction of route
from Syria, Jordan and Palestine.
a. He ordered Shurahbeel, Yazeed and Amr to give up
the territory and join him at Jabiya.
b. Khalid with the mobile guard of 4000
horsemen was left behind as a rear guard; and instead of staying at Jabiya, he
moved forward and clashed with the leading element of the Roman army. He struck
at the head of the Roman column and drove it back towards Damascus.
c. The Muslims having movement a few miles
South East establishing a line of camps in the eastern part of the plain of Yarmuk.
Khalid Concept of Operation
11. Being
appt as the overall commander, Khalid visualized that, being dispersed at 4
places would not be favourable to combat Roman Army which was 4 times larger
than that of Muslim’s. Thus he proposed to concentrate his forces at one place
for an aggressive defensive operation.
a. Khalid’s Concept of Operation was to wear down the
numerically superior enemy while in defense and then destroy him with a deadly
counter offensive.
b. He planned to take maximum Advantage of the topographical
situation.
c. Initially the Muslims would stand on defense, receive and
contain the Roman attack until it had lost its impetus and the enemy was worn
out.
d. Then the Muslims would go on to the offensive and drive the
Romans towards Wadi-Ur-Raqqad. The terrible ravine could be the anvil on which
the Muslims hammer would crush the Roman Army to dust.
e. His concept also included plan to separate the cavalry from
infantry so that infantry could be defeated by flanking attack with Muslim cavalry.
Forces Deployment of Belligerents
12. Muslim Disposition in the Battlefield. The army was deployed on a front of 11 miles,
corresponding roughly to the Roman Army front. The Armies left rested on the
Yarmuk river, a mile forward of where the ravine began, while its right lay on
the Jabiya road. (flanks were secured by the river Yarmuk on the south, Saimen
hills-Nawa village on the north and Azra hills protected the rear).The disposition
was as under:
a. On the left stood the corps of Yazeed and on the right the
corps of Amr-bin-al-Aas.
b. Each of these flanking corps commanders was given a cavalry
regiment as UC.
c. The centre was formed by the corps of Abu-Ubeida (left) and
Shurahbeel (right).
d. Behind the centre stood the Mobile Guard and one Cavalry Regiment
as a central reserve for employing on the orders of Khalid.
e. Zarrar was appointed as the alternative commander of Mobile
Guard.
f. Each corps pushed out a line of scouts to keep the Romans
under observation.
g. Muslims Army stood three ranks deep with no gap within the
rank.
13. Deployment of Roman Forces. Mahan organized his vast army into 4 corps
and deployed them ahead of Allan Nullah on a 12 miles frontage (extended from
Yarmuk to south of the hills at Jabiya) in 30 files each from north to south
facing the Muslims, keeping Yarmuk river at their right and Wadi-Ur-Raqqad
Nullah at their rear. The distribution of forces was as under:
a. Qanateer – On the left flank.
b. Gregory – On the
right flank.
c. Deirjan – In the centre. Centre was formed by Dierjan including
Armenian Army. (Qureen took over the command in the second day after the death
of Deirjan).
d. Mahan – In reserve.
e. Jabla – In the forward as screen (ahead of the front line
across entire 12 miles front Mahan deployed the Christian Arab Army of Jabla
which was mounted on horse and camel as a screen).
f. Cavalry was equally distributed among the four armies and
each army depl its infantry holding front and cavalry as reserve in rear.
g. Roman infantry stood 30 ranks deep. Infantry on the right
flank under Gregory were tied with chains to prevent desertion from the battle.
The Battle
14. 1st
Day. The opening bout
started with individual duel in which the Muslims won. At mid-day Roman infantry
moved forward and engaged the Muslims with intense archery. The attack was
repulsed with more casualties of the Romans.
15. 2nd
Day.
a. Roman attack frontally.
b. Then they attack both the flanks
simultaneously. Yazeed and Amr were pushed back.
c. Roman frontal attack was repulsed.
d. To restore the sit Khalid charge with
his mob cav once on the right and then on the left flank.
e. Zerrar went through centre and killed
Dierjan.
16. 3rd
Day.
a. Roman attacked Amr and Shurahbeel in
the right flank and Muslims were pushed back.
b. Khalid launched his cavalry reserve
against the flank of Qanateer.
c. Amrs cavalry struck Qanateer in his
left flank.
d. Infantry of Amr and Shurahbeel counter attacked
frontally.
17. 4th
Day.
a. Mahan
attacked both the flanks.
b. Amr
was pushed back.
c. When Abu Ubeida and Yazeed attacked on
Romans right flank, Shurahbeels position became untenable.
d. Muslim stood fast and held back with
hand to hand fight.
e. Abu Ubeida and Yazeed attacked on
Romans right flank.
f. Khalid charged with his reserve and
restored the situation.
18. 5th
Day. The Romans sought ceasefire
but Khalid did not accept. So Roman went for defensive battle, no fighting took
place on 5th day.
19. 6th
day.
a. Phase I. Centre and left Corps launched holding attack
and Amr launched a frontal attack with infantry. Khalid attacked on the Roman
left and also on the cavalry of the left corps from the rear at the same time.
The cavalry withdraw from the battlefield.
b. Phase II. Khalid then turned to the cavalry of
Armenians from the rear, Amr attacked on the left and Shurahbeel from the
front. Cavalry withdraw but the Armenians continued to fight.
c. Phase III. Khalid then attacked on the Mahan’s cavalry
Reserve from both front and flank. Attack on Armenians front continued.
d. Phase IV. Mahan with cavalry fled away from the
battlefield leaving infantry on mercy. Khalid then attacked the Armenians from
the rear. Armenians then started to retreat towards the west.
e. Phase V. Ubeida and Yazeed launched a massive
frontal attack on the remaining Roman infantry and they also started to retreat
to the west towards Wadi-ur-Raqqad where Zarrar with 500 horsemen had already
been positioned in the previous night.
f. Phase VI. The Romans were crushed on the anvil
created by Zarrar and the Wadi-ur-Raqqad and most of the Romans died.
20. 7th
day. Khalid set off for a
fresh pursuit. He caught the Roman rear guard and killed Mahan.
Causes of Muslim Victory
21. The Main Causes of Muslims Victory.
a. Motivated on the Faith of Allah. The spirit of Islam was deeply rooted in the
soul of the Muslim forces, which devoted themselves for the cause of Islam.
Moreover becoming martyrs for Islam was moral boosting for the Muslim force.
b. Sound and Flexible Plan. Initially the Muslims decided to fight a defensive
battle to the south of Yarmuk. After detection of the Roman deployment Khalid
reviewed the plan and took the Advantage of the ground. The sound and flexible
superior plan of the Muslim commanders facilitated the smooth tactical conduct
of the battle.
c. Greater Mobility. The
Arabs were simple and unsophisticated sons of desert. For their livelihood they used to move over
long distance rapidly. This made them
master of the camels and horses. Ultimately this gave the Muslim forces greater
mobility for accomplishing strategic moves.
d. Aggressiveness of Muslim Commanders. Khalid remained aggressive throughout the battle.
Roman commander failed to exploit their initial second thrust and thus the aggressive
Muslim comd snatched the initiative by charging his cavalry against Roman right
flank.
e. Timely Use of Reserve. Khalid allured Mahan to commit his reserve
prematurely, whereas he maneuvered his cavalry reserve to the rear of the Roman
Army and charged from the rear. This timely use of the Muslims reserve was the
corner stone of Muslim victory.
f. Superior Tactics. This type of strategic redeployment,
selection of ground, military technics,
tactics and this type of cavalry charge was introduced for the first time by
the Genius Muslim commanders. Muslims superior tactics and technics surprised
the Romans.
g. Superior Leadership. Arabia produced a gallery of brilliant Generals.
There’s courage and capacity, sense of judgment, assessment of the situation,
plan and conduct for the battle established them as superior leader.
h. Sound Intelligence. Muslim army had effective intelligence
network. They could knew the intention of Romans before the battle which led the
Muslims to concentrate in the plain of
Yarmuk rather to be defeated in
isolation in well dispersed places.
i. Concentration of Force. Muslim could concentrate all his troops in
the battle field to under the single unified command.
Military Lessons of the Battle
22. Lessons
learnt in the battle are as follows:
a. Defense can also be a Stronger Form of War.
Khalid had proved in this battle that
defense is a stronger form of war. For this, selection of ground and aggressive
posture were most important factors.
b. Simple and Flexible Plan. Mahan thought to crush the Muslims by the overwhelming
superiority; whereas Khalid showed unique example of simplicity and flexibility
in his plan.
c. Mobility and Aggressiveness. Khalid
proved that mobility and aggressive defense should go together for decisive result.
d. Timely Employment of Mobile Reserve. Mobile reserve must be employed
decisively at the most appropriate time with boldness when the enemy resilience
is broken.
e. Classic Combination of Maneuver. Classic combination of various maneuvers
like turning movement and flanking attack pays rich dividend in the battle.
f. Identify the Enemy Weakness. Enemy’s weak point must be identified and
exploited with decisive counter attack.
g. Enemy should not be underestimated. Enemy should never be
underestimated. Romans committed this blander and paid very heavily.
h. Use of Reserve. Reserve must not be committed prematurely.
Mahan committed this blander, whereas, Khalid held his own reserve to launch it
at decisive moment.
j. Righteousness of Cause. Muslim
forces had to fight for the survival of Islam against the Romans.
k. Morale. It was proved during this battle that, a superior force
could be defeated by a smaller force with high morale.
l. Good leadership. Khalid-bin-walid and other Muslim commanders
had proved to be better than their counter-parts in planning and conduct of
war.
m. Initiative Must Not be Surrendered. In the battle of Yarmuk the Roman Army
lost the initiative because their command failed to maintain aggressiveness and
surrender initiative to his opponent.
n. Selection of Best Ground. For defensive battle, selection of ground
is a prime factor. Khalid studied the ground in detail and made his master
plan.
p. Cooperation. There was highest degree of cooperation
in the Muslim commanders. In the plan Abu Obaida asked to concentrate at
Jabiya. All followed it, which led the
Muslim into victory.
q. Unity. In the battle of Yarmuk all
the forces were brought under unified command and result is well versed.
r. Sound Intelligence. Sun Tzu said “An army without spies
is like a man without ears or eyes”. Muslim army had effective intelligence
network. This sound intelligence helped them to analyses the Romans preparation,
threat and subsequently the Muslims preparation and plan.
s. Surprise. It was a great surprise for the Romans to get the Emessa as an
abandon city. Again during the battle Khalid’s maneuver made the Romans
surprise and they had to pay very heavily at the ford of Wadi-Ur-Raqqad.
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