General
1. The
battle was fought between Indo-Bangladesh Joint Forces and occupied Pakistani Army
from 30 November-05 December 1971. The Allied Forces achieved a magnificent
victory in this battle. 11 East Bengal, 2 East Bengal, Sec 3 troops, Mukti
Bahini and Indian 57 Mountain Division participated in this battle.
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The
Importance of Eastern Sector
2. The
eastern sector extended from north of Sylhet to south of Cox’s Bazar. It was
bounded by the Meghalaya plateau in the north and the Lushai and Mizo Hills in
the east, the Bay of Bengal in the south and the Meghna river in the west. It offered
the shortest approach to Dhaka and the best opportunity to destroy the
defending forces in detail by crushing them with Meghna at their rear. As such
this sector had a great tactical significance for any operation aimed at Dhaka.
Akhaura was a major communication center in the eastern sector located at the
junction of three railway lines east of the Tista river loop. The railway line
connecting Akhaura and Dhaka crossed the Meghna over the Bhairab bridge.
Akhaura was connected by road with Agartala in the south-east and to Gangasagor
by a track unsuitable for vehicle traffic. The Distance to Dhaka from Agartala
is 70 KM in a straight-line. Agartala airfield on the Indian side was a few
hundred meters from the border. Any enemy presence in the Akhaura area posed a
serious potential threat to Agartala airfield as well as the important town of
Agartala.
Salient
of the Defender’s and Attacker’s Plan
3. Defender’s Plan.
a. 12
FFR, two companies of EPCAF, one field battery and one troop of PT-76 tanks
occupied Akhaura and Gangasagar.
b. 33
Baluch occupied the area south of Gangasagar with one company EPCAF at Kasba. One
field battery was in support.
c. 98
Muzahid and one company of 21 Azad Kashmir (AK) occupied Madhebpur.
d. HQ
27 Infantry Brigade was located at Brahmanbaria which was occupied as a depth
position by an adhoc force consisting of one company of 21 AK and one of Baluch
along with a company of EPCAF. It was supported by a field battery.
4. Attacker’s Plan. 57 Mountain Division planned to capture Akhaura
in 3 phases. Attack the objective from south using 7 and 11 Brigades and with S
Force and 3 Sector troops from the north.
a. Phase-1.
(1) 311 Mountain Brigade to capture the area of Lonasar and Noapara.
(2) 11 East Bengal established a stop in the area across the Titas
and west of Akhaura railway bridge.
b. Phase-2.
(1) 73 Mountain Brigade to capture Karnel Bazar and Gangasagar and
to threaten Akhaura from the south.
(2) Siera Force consisting of 2 East Bengal,
Mukti Bahini and one Indian battalion was ordered to dominate Singarbil jetty
and capture Rajapur. This force was ordered to simulate a major attack on
Akhaura in conjunction with the operation from the south.
c. Phase-3. Akhaura was to be captured by using both brigades attack from
the south.
Short
Accountability of the Battle
5. Phase-1.
a. On
30 November, 11 East Bengal blocked northern approach at Harashpur.
b. On
01 December, 311 Mountain Brigade secured Noapara and Lonasar. Meanwhile, 7 Mountain
Brigade reached Maniad near Gangasagar.
6. Phase-2.
a. 2
East Bengal launched attack and captured Singarbil jetty and Rajapur. Sector 3
troops captured Azampur railway station but it was recaptured by Pakistani counter
attack on night 1/2 December.
b. 311
Mountain Brigade sent 4 Guards to establish a blocking position at Kodda on
Akhaura- Brahmanbaria railway line.
c. On
02 December, Pakistani force launched attack on 4 Guards at Kodda and carried
out shelling and air strike on Sector troops.
d. On 03 December, 2 East Bengal recaptured
Azampur railway station. Meanwhile 7 Mountain Brigade captured Gangasagar and
linked with 311 Mountain Brigade at Lonasar.
7. Phase-3.
a. 7
Mountain Brigade was tasked to establish road block on Kasba- Brahmanbaria road
whereas 311 Mountain Brigade to attack Akhaura from south and S Force from
north.
b. On
04 December, S Force were held up due to mines and anti-tank ditches.
c. By
05 December, 0700 hours Akhaura was captured by 311 Mountain Brigade and Sec troops.
Pakistani forces withdraw towards Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj leaving behind large
amount of arms, ammunition and two tanks.
Causes of Pakistani Defeat
8. Main causes of Pakistani defeat in this
battle are:
a. Pakistani
forces did not show determination and did not have fighting capability. They
left behind two PT-76 tanks and large amount of arms and ammunition.
b. They
also failed to blow up the railway bridge over Titas.
c. Akhaura
was the key to their defense, yet they had not reacted strongly to recapture it.
d. The
neighboring battalion at Kasba had been only a spectator and had withdrawn
rather than reinforces Akhaura or counter attack or divert Allied troops from
main battle.
e. Pakistani
had made hardly any effort to interfere with Allied battle plans.
f. They
resorted to static defense, thus accepting defeat in detail.
Lessons Learnt
9. Following lessons can be learnt from
this battle:
a. Determination
in fighting the battle.
b. Successful
link up operation is a key to victory.
c. Feint
attack to deceive enemy.
d. Effective radio interception to know enemy
plans.
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