General
The battle, which turned
the tide in favour of the Allied forces in ‘North African Campaign’ is popularly known as
the Battle of El Alamein, was fought between Allied 8th Army Commanded by General
Montgomery and Axis forces (Panzer Armee Afrika) under Field Marshal Rommel.
The battle was fought at El Alamien of northern Egypt from 23 October to 04
November 1942. In this battle the Axis forces were completely routed and their
fighting power broken significantly in North Africa.
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| Figure-1: Military Battles- North African Campaign |
Strategic Importance of North Africa
Geo-Strategic Importance
of Egypt
Egypt sat like a spider in its’ web, at the center of a crucial
geo-strategic networks that include the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Abyssinia
(invaded by the Italians in 1936 and liberated by the British in 1941), the
Middle East and the Suez Canal.
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| Figure-2: Military Battles-Geo-Strategic Importance of Egypt |
Prevent the German
Concentration on the East European Front
After the German invasion of Russia in 1941,
there was a strong case, military and political, for preventing the Germans
from concentrating on the East European Front.
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| Figure-3: Military Battles-East European Front |
Opening a Second Front
at North Africa
The German forces invaded Russia on 22 June. Germans were
stopped at Moscow at the same time of battle
of Alam Halfa. Both Stalin and Churchill wanted to open a second
front defeating the Axis forces at North Africa. It was evident that the Axis
forces planned to conduct a big ‘Pincer Move’ to capture Persian Gulf region.
This would result in reduction of Allied war effort by 25% due to fall of oil
refineries to the Axis hand. This enabled the British and Americans to prepare for
a massive amphibious operation called ‘OPERATION OVERLORD’.
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| Figure-4: Military Battles-Opening a Second Front at North Africa |
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| Figure-5: Military Battles-Operation Overload |
Depletion of Axis Land
Forces
After the fall of France in 1940, the British and
Commonwealth troops could not engage the Germans and Italians on land in any
theatre. The humbling of Mussolini was an important objective in it’s own
right.
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| Figure-6: Military Battles-Fall of France |
Dominance over the
Mediterranean Sea
If the Allies won North Africa they would have a better chance
of holding the Mediterranean, which was the epicenter of the war.
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| Figure-7: Military Battles-Mediterranean Sea |
Importance to Italians
Benito Mussolini began
to worry that once the Axis powers had won the war he would have very little to
use as bargaining chip when it came to territorial distribution. Thus he chose
North Africa to initiate the campaigns against the British.
Probability of
German-Japan Overland Connection
One of the fears of the Allies was that Japan would invade India
and Germany would invade North Africa and thereafter, the two would meet
somewhere in between, crippling Britons supply lines from India. As it turns
out this was never a real threat, but it did cause occasional worry on the part
of Churchill.
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| Figure-8: Military Battles-Probability of German-Japan Overland Connection |
Description of the
Battle Ground
The very location of
Mediterranean Sea on its immediate north and Qattara Depression on its 40 miles
south made El Alamein the only position secure against encirclement.
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| Figure-9: Military Battles-Qattara Depression |
The Feature of Qattara
is few thousand square miles in area, about 400 feet below sea level with about
800 feet steep cliff throughout its northern edge. This dried up inland sea is
full of quick sand and salt marshes, impassable even for camels.
There were few ridges
namely Ruwaisat, Alam Halfa, Tell el Eisa and Miteirya dominating the battle
ground.
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| Figure-10: Military Battles-Description of the Battle Ground |
Strategic Importance of El-Alamein
El Alamein is a railway
station of North West Egypt, located 60 miles south west of Alexandria, having no
strategic importance. But it had tactical values to both the forces.
The very location of Mediterranean Sea on its immediate north and Qattara
Depression on its 40 miles south made El Alamein the only position secure against
encirclement.
There was no suitable
defense line after that to defend Egypt and the Suez Canal for the Allied.
The only coastal road
and the railway line ran through the small villages of El Alamein.
Loss of El Alamein would
have caused loss of Suez Canal with ultimate loss of oil refineries in Abadan,
which would have reduced the British war effort by approximately 25%.
The strategic loss of
Suez Canal would have cut off the shorter sea Line of Communication for the
British to Burma and India.
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| Figure-11: Military Battles-Strategic Importance of El-Alamein |
Background
Beginning of North African Campaign
On 10th June 1940 Italy joined Germany in Axis force that time she had
Libya at North Africa as her colony and Egypt on the east of Libya was British
colony.
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| Figure-12: Military Battles-Beginning of North African Campaign |
Advance of Italian Force
On 13 September 1940. Italian force started advance towards east and crossed
the border. They advanced upto Sidi Barrani around 75 miles in Egypt and
established themselves in a chain of fortified camps. Week after week they
passed without any attempt to move on.
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| Figure-13: Military Battles-Advance of Italian Force |
Advance of Allied Forces
Allied forces captured upto “Sidi Barrani” by 10 Dec 1940 and pursued Axis
forces. They advanced upto Agheila, around 600 miles inside Libya.
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| Figure-14: Military Battles-Advance of Allied Forces |
Arrival of Rommel and
Advance of Axis Forces
General Rommel reached Libya
on 12 February 1941 and his Africa corps completed reaching North Africa
by March 1941.He than started his advance eastward in march 1941 and pushed
Allied forces. By June 41, he captured up to Sollum, an area on the border
inside Egypt.
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| Figure-15: Military Battles-Arrival of Rommel and Advance of Axis Forces |
Retreat of Rommel
After the retreat of Allied forces in 3rd week of June 1941,
General Wavell was replaced by Gen Auchinlek as Commander in Chief of that
theatre. In November 1941, a series of offensive and counter offensive against
Axis forces. In November and December 1941. Allied started their fresh
offensive against Axis forces. In November and December 1941, a series of
offensive and counter offensive took place around and in between Tobruk to
Sollum. By the end of December 1941,Rommel was pushed back upto Agedabia,
approximately 100 miles north-west of Agheila.
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| Figure-16: Military Battles-Retreat of Rommel |
Fresh and 2nd Advance of
Rommel
In January 1942, Gen Rommel started his fresh advance east ward. After series
of offensive launched at Benghazi, Gazala, Tobruk and Marsa Matruh pushing the
Allied forces. Rommel reached El-Alamien 60 miles east of Alexandria by the end
of June 1942.
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| Figure-17: Military Battles-Fresh and 2nd Advance of Rommel |
First Battle of El-Alamien
After
their retreat, the Allied forces took up defense at EL-Alamein to save Egypt
from falling into the hands of Rommel. In July 1942, Rommel launched several
attack on Allied defense at Alamein but failed.
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| Figure-18: Military Battles-First Battle of El-Alamien |
Battle of Alam El Halfa
In August 1942,
General Alexander replaced General Aucninleck as commander in Chief. General
Gott also took over 8th Army, but due to his death on next day by an air crash,
General Montgomery took over 8th Army. With the intention of breaking the
Allied defence line. Rommel launched attack on Alam Halfa Ridge behind defence
line on 30 August 1942, but failed due to lack of logistics. then rommel
quickly took up defence in EL-Alamein line facing the allied defense.
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| Figure-19: Military Battles-Battle of Alam El Halfa |
Rommel’s Concept of Battle and Defense Plan
Planning Consideration
Field Marshal Rommel, who is also known as "Desert
Fox" brought a number of axis victory through mobile warfare in the
desert. But under following compulsion Rommel opted for static form of defense
in El-Alamein.
Under Strength of Motorized Unit
Number of motorized units Rommel had were far below than Allied. More so, the
reinforcement which were coming in were also mostly non-motorized. So, they
could only have a role to play in static defense.
Allied Superiority in Armour
Allied enjoyed 2.5x1 armour superiority.
Air Supremacy of Allied Forces
The Allied forces enjoyed 3.5 x 1 air supremacy thus Allied forces would make
motorized column of Axis forces helpless and vulnerable.
Acute Shortage of POL
The acute shortage of POL restricted wide scale movement of tanks and vehicles
across desert, which is most vital for any mobile warfare. On the contrary, he
could save POL through static def which could be used to disengage and moving
away troops during TRD if possible.
Acute Shortage of
Ammunition
After the Battle of Alam Halfa Axis did not
receive adequate C Supply. They were running acute shortage of all types of
ammunition which forced Rommel to undertake static defense.
Concept of Operation
So, Rommel knew that his
resources would not permit to integrate a TRD plan with his overall def plan.
Therefore, he concentrated on making up a strong position defense to repel
enemy break through on following basis :
a.
Defense location had to be well developed and held at any cost. Thus reducing
enemy strength through process of attrition.
b.
Any penetration to be halted and repulsed by launching Counter attack with
mobile reserve held at the back.
c. Position defense should be fully integrated
with natural and artificial obstacles.
Axis Defense
a.
Minefield. A huge belt of defensive minefield was
laid along the whole front of no man's land. Some 5,00,000 mines mostly
antitank were laid to stop en tanks. The minefield was further strengthened by
the use of captured British Shells/bombs fitted with electronic detonating
system.
b.
Out Posts. A no of lightly
held outposts were sited within the minefield. They were provided with tracking
dogs. Their task was to provide Early Warning of allied breaching effort and
direct fire on to them.
c.
Main Defense.
It was located 1-2 thousand yards west of minefield. It has an average depth of
3,000 yards. Non motorized units were used to held the main defensive position.
They also had protective minefields all around. Main defensive position was
organized into 3 sectors. Disposition of various sectors were as
follow:
(1) Northern
Sector.
164 German Division.
Trento Italian Division.
(2) Central
Sector.
Italian Bologna
Division.
Italian Brescia
Division.
(3) Southern Sector.
Italian Folgore
Division.
Italian Pavia Division.
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| Figure-20: Military Battles-Axis Defense |
d.
Mobile Reserve. It consisted of Panzer Divisions and
Italian Armoured Divisions. They were concentrating behind main defensive
position to mainly Counter attack and destroy enemy penetration. Their guns were
also tasked to strengthen Defensive Fire power of main defensive position.
Disposition of various formations in this case was as
under:
(1) For
Northern Sector
15 Panzer
Division.
Italian Littorio Division.
(2) For
Central and Southern Sector
21 Panzer
Division.
Italian Ariete Division.
e.
Central Mobile Reserve. Following formations were kept in central
reserve of PANZER ARMEE AFRICA.
(1) 90
German Light
Division.
(2) 1´German Flak
Division.
(3) 1´Italian Trieste Division.
f.
Line of Communication. Axis defense relied on a
supply route which ran along the coast towards west. The primary supply base
was at Tobruk while Bengazi remained a far away supply base in case Tobruk fall
in enemy's hand.
Montgomery's Concept of
Battle
Since it was not possible to outflank, the consideration of punching a hole in
the enemy's position to break in was prime importance.
Dispatch of corps strong in armour through the hole into the enemy territory to
break out.
Thereafter develop operations to destroy Rommel's
forces.
Since armour can't break through the enemy defense, it would have to be primarily
and infantry battle.
Montgomery's Final Plan
Attack Plan.
On 06 October 1942 the 8th Army command gave out his final plan for the
operation code named "Light Foot" salient features of the plan are as
follow:
a.
Main thrust. By 30 Corps to the north to
take place between Tell El Eisa and Mitteira ridge area. Attack would be in a
narrow front of 6-7 miles keeping 04x Divisions in front. This corps was to
establish brH behind en main defense upto "Line Oxalic". They would
then prepare two corridors through minefields and through these lanes 10th
corps was to
pass.
b.
Secondary thrust. By 13 corps in the
south was to stage two attacks. One would be directed against Himeimat feature
while the other one against Jebel Kalakh feature. These attacks were to be made
with the primary objective of misleading the enemy and thereby containing
forces that might otherwise be used against 30th corps to the
north.
c.
Both the above corps were to destroy the enemy holding the forward
positions.
d.
Armour Thrust. 10th Corps was to
pass through corridor and deploy them in "Line Pierson" west of
"Oxalic". They would protect 30 corps from enemy interference. And
its final objective was the destruction of the enemy's
armour.
e.
The attack was to start at night of 23/24 October with full moon.
Artillery Plan.
Artillery would first carry out CB on axis battery positions. After that they
would switch to main defensive position and neutralize enemy position by
artillery concentration. Total about 1200 guns of different Caliber were used
for opening battle.
Air Plan. They would at
first augment CB efforts of Artillery by engaging enemy gun position. Later they
would switch over to enemy armour concentration and destroy them.
Deception Plan/ Cover
Plan.
Allied forces knew that a strategic surprise was impossible as enemy was sanguine of
Allied attack. So the planners concentrated on concealing weight, direction, time and place of attack
in order to achieve tactical surprise. As such a cover plan was drawn up as follows:
a. Concealment
of Concentration.
(1)
The SO worked out complete layout of the battle front of the day of the attack.
Then dummy vehicles were used to achieve the density of vehicles require for
the assault 2-3 weeks before. As concentration of troops and vehicles progressed
the dummy vehicles were replaced with real one and all taking place at night.
Similarly at the hours of darkness some special dummy vehicles were made under
which guns were concealed. Thereby enemy air photo failed to notice any
significant change on the battle field.
(2)
Serious control was exercised on forward
movements.
(3)
Tanks were camouflaged as trucks and fake tanks were prepared to mislead the
enemy about armour
concentration.
(4)
Slit trenches were dug at night and camouflaged about a month before. They were
later used to conceal troops as they arrived into the front line.
b.
Deceive Enemy about Direction of Attack.
Following steps were taken to simulate attack on southern side:
(1)
Dummy dumping was carried out. 5 mile dummy railway lines, 20 mile pipe lines
and water installation were constructed in the southern
front.
(2) A
false WS channel representing movement of armour division to the south was
launched.
(3) In
the north movements was strictly controlled while in south it was
encouraged.
c.
Deceive Enemy about Time of Attack. The
construction of pipe line progressed in such a manner that its completion would
take 2-3 weeks after the time of attack. As such axis would be mislead to guess
about the time of Allied attack.
d.
Allure Enemy to Commit Reserve. A feint
amphibious landing was planned to take place at enemy's rear from the sea 04
hours after attack had started. This way, it was expected that enemy would
commit portion of its reserve to deal with this. To materialize this plan, a
convoy set off from Alexandria at 1600 hours on 23 October 1942.
OPERATION LIGHT FOOT
Plan. Break in
phase of Allied offensive at EI Alamein was given code name ‘Light Foot’.
Montgomery planned to destroy Rommel’s inf formations first and then the
Armoured forces. He employ his armour to hold Rommel’s armour while his
Infantry formation were being destroyed. The plan was as under:
a.
The Allied to attack the axis
defense simultaneously on both the flanks.
b.
The main attack was to be launched
by 30 corps in the north, to breach two corridors through the Axis defense and
minefields.
c.
10 corps was to pass through these
corridors and capture important ground astride Axis supply route.
d.
In the south, 13 corps was to break
into the enemy position and advance with 7 Armoured Division to draw Rommel’s
armour thereby maintain balance of force.
e.
The RAF was to gain air supremacy
before the commencement of battle and support land operations.
Execution.
a.
Break in Phase (23-24 Oct 1942).
(1)
Operation ‘Light Foot’ began with artillery barrage at
2140 hours on 23 October 1942.
(2)
On the north, 30 Corps with four divisions (9
AUS, 51 HL, 2 NZ and 1 SA) launched attack and established two corridors.
(3)
On the south, 13 Corps launched two attacks and
was held up between the minefield but was successful in keeping 21 Panzer in
its sector.
(4)
On 24 October 1942, by dawn most of the units of 30 Corps reached their ‘Oxalic
line’ objective.
(5)
On 24 October 1942, 10 Corps advanced with 1 and
10 Armoured Division and moved through northern and southern corridor
respectively. But 10 Corps was unable to clear the brH.
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| Figure-21: Military Battles-Break in Phase |
b.
Dog Fight Phase (24 - 30 October 1942).
(1)
On 24 October 1942, 1 Armoured Division and 51
Highland Division advanced through northern corridor and achieved
Breakout.
(2)
10 Armoured Division and 2 NZ Division attack
through the southern corridor and breakout was achieved after a delay.
(3)
Counter attack by 15 Panzer Division was bounced
back, 15 Panzer losing 88 out of 119 tanks.
(4)
Shifting the weight of the attack Montgomery
asked 9 AUS Division to attacked north-west towards Rahman tr. 1 Armour
Division could not advance beyond kidney Ridge.
(5)
On 27 October 1942, Montgomery decided to
regroup. 2 NZ Divisions was replaced by 1 SA and 4 IND Division. 7 Armoured
Division from 13 Corps brought to North.
(6)
Two German tankers were sunk. Fuel shortage of Panzer Army became acute.
(7)
Further attack by 9 AUS Division in the north
drove a wedge into the enemy position by 28/29 October.
(8)
On 30/31 October, AUS Division continued its attempt to cut off the enemy
forces in coastal salient.
(9)
Operation Light Foot ended and failed to breach
a major portion of Rommel’s defense. Montgomery decided to readjust his plan
and code named it operation ‘Supercharge’.
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| Figure-22: Military Battles-Dog Fight Phase |
OPERATION SUPER CHARGE
General. The
breakout phase of the offensive operation of the Allied was given code name
‘Super Charge’. This involved fresh re-grouping of forces and could not be
launched before Night 01/02 November 1942.
Plan.
a.
30 Corps.
Launch Night attack westwards, hold flanks of the corridor and provide a Fire
Base for further offensive operation.
b.
10 Corps.
Breakout through brH created by 30 Corps. Exploit success towards north-west
and cut off enemy supply route. Be prepare to fight way through Rommel’s forces
in case 30 Corps failed to establish brH.
Execution.
a.
Operation Super Charge commenced on
02 November 1942.
b.
On 02 November, 1 Armoured Division advance but was held up by hy Antitank
fire. A furious battle of tank engagement was fought between 1 Armoured
Division with Rommel’s 15 Panzer and LITTORIO Armoured Division. 1
Armoured Division moved through to eliminate the opposition.
c.
At Night on 03 November 1942, 1 SA and 4 IND
Division achieved breakthrough in the southern corridor forcing back Axis
screen.
d. On
04 November 1942, after further fighting Axis troops finally began to retreat
along the coast road which was followed by 1, 7 and 10 Armoured
Divisions.
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| Figure-23: Military Battles-OPERATION SUPER CHARGE |
Causes of Axis Defeat
Axis Inferiority in
Strength. Axis inferiority
in strength in terms of fighting troops, armour, guns, air craft was one of the
main contributing factor to their defeat.
Inferiority of Weapon
and Equipment. Axis weapon and
equipment were mostly of inferior quality than the Allied ones. Their artillery
and tank guns both had shorter range than that of the Allied. Moreover Italian
weapon, equipment and armament were of further inferior quality.
Lack of Logistic Back Up.
Rommel was short of all forms of supply. During the month of
September/ October sup reduced to 40% of the minimum essential
requirement.
Lack of Air Support.
The Axis forces were operating
against a massive superior allied air force. This had caused serious
limitations on the mobility of the Axis forces.
Positional Defense.
The Axis had advantage in training and command experience in mobile warfare.
But because of overwhelming allied superiority both on ground and in air, they
had to adopt a positional defense. It was of a definite disadvantage to
them.
Insecure and
Overstretched Line of Communication. Constant bombing by the Allied air
force made both the land and sea Line of Communication extremely insecure.
500 miles long Line of Communication from Bengazi was a very long distance for
the Axis to cover with fewer vehicles under enemy air interruption.
Shortage of Artillery
Ammunition. Because of shortage of artillery ammunition, General
Stumme, who was in Axis command on the day the Allied offensive commenced, did
not authorized opening of artillery guns, which could probably have caused
considerable damage to the Allied forces.
Inferior Fighting
Quality of the Italians.
Italians in North Africa never fought with determination. Their morale was
already low before this battle and it became worse with inadequate supply
thereafter.
Poor Intelligence and
Foresightness. The Axis Commander General
Stumme failed to gain information or anticipate the weight, date and time and
direction of Allied main and secondary thrusts. As a result Axis were
surprised.
Absence of Rommel.
In the opening of offensive Rommel was in Europe being sick. Stumme who
conducted the battle initially did not know as to how Rommel planned to fight
the defensive battle. On the first day Stumme died and Rommel had to conduct
the battle in a difficult situation.
Cover Plan. Montgomery's
cover plan was materialized and achieved complete tactical surprise regarding
time and direction of attack.
Lessons Learnt
a. Aim. Aim must be kept in mind throughout to win a battle. In spite of difficulties in the north, Allied did not shift the weight of attack south as they aimed to cut off the coast road along Mediterranean.
b.
Morale. Leadership, equipment and training built up the morale which
helped the 8th Army achieving victory. On the other hand, Italian’s morale on
the Axis side was always low and they could never fight with
determination.
c.
Aggressive Action. Aggressive
action brings victory in a battle. Despite difficulties, Allied always exerted
pressure on the enemy in all sectors through assault on enemy position,
indirect fire by artillery, air action, raid and aggressive patrolling.
d.
Surprise. Surprise always plays a big part in any attack. Though
it was not possible for the Allied forces to achieve strategic surprise, but an
elaborate cover plan to deceive the enemy about the weight, time and direction
of attack helped achieving complete tactical surprise.
e.
Concentration. Concentration of superior force is of utmost
importance for success in battle. Allied concentration of force, was so great
that the Axis had no match to it.
f.
Flexibility. Flexibility in planning and execution always brings
fruit. Allied plans were sound and flexible. Due to flexible planning, on 27
October Rommel could shift 7 Armoured Division from 13 Corps to 30 Corps to
fight in threatened northern front.
g.
Synchronization. Synchronization is a
prerequisite for a successful campaign. All action must be synchronized and for
that cooperation amongst the services is very important. Allied forces improved
cooperation amongst sister services through several exercises and coordination
thereby all their action was synchronized.
h.
Administration and Logistics. Sound administration and logistics
system is a must for any military operation. Axis forces suffered heavy
due to poor logistic backup. No amount of bravery and training can
compensate for lack of supply particularly weapons, ammunition, POL etc.
j.
Security.
Security is an important aspect for winning a battle. The plan of the attack
was not discussed to the troops till last moment. No Visitors were allowed in
8th Army area from 8 October. Line of Communication of 8 Army was also secured.
The forward movement of the men and material were done under the cover of
darkness through concealed routes.
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